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"THE PREJUDICE OF CASTE":
THE MISREADING OF JUSTICE HARLAN
AND THE ASCENDENCY OF ANTICLASSIFICATION
Scott Grinsell*
77is Article reconsiders the familiar reading ofJnstice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson as standing for the principle of constitutional colorblindness by examining
the significancc of Harlan's use of the metaphor "caste" in the opinion. By
overlooking Harlan's invocation of "caste," it argues that conservative proponents qf
antic/assification have reclaimed the opinion for "colorblindness," and buried a
pouerfil statement of the antisubordination principle that is at the heart of our
equality law'.
The Article begins by examining the emergence of a reading of the opinion as
articulating a view of equality lau based in anticlassication. The Article then
returns to the nineteenth century to offer an alternative reading of the opinion. It
argues that by time Harlan invoked the caste metaphor in Plessy, the caste
metaphor uwas part of a longstanding tradition of reasoning about the moral stakes of
status hierarchy and social subordination. It examines the emergence, in the
nineteenth century, of the image of caste in abolitionist rhetoric and in debates over
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment during Reconstruction. The Article
furtier challenges the conventional reading of Harlan's dissent, by considering the
persistence of the caste metaphor in the context of Brown v. Board of Education
and its qftermath.
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Our equality law is haunted by the specter of caste.' In his dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson,Justice Harlan evoked the image of "caste" when he pro-
tested,"[t]here is no caste here," but the power of that phrase has faded in
debates over the significance of the opinion for the equal protection tra-
dition.' The image of caste in Justice Harlan's dissent has been long
overshadowed by his admonition which immediately follows it-that
"[o]ur constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens."" The metaphor of colorblindness now most strongly
marks the meaning of Harlan's dissent in debates about the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause. These readings forget the lineage of argu-
ments about caste in the nineteenth century and consequently misread
the dissent as articulating a principle of constitutional colorblindness that
was ultimately redeemed by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.4
American equality law has long been characterized by struggles be-
tween proponents of anticlassification and antisubordination principles. In
debates over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, proponents of
anticlassification argue that the harms with which the Equal Protection
Clause is concerned are directed at the classification of individuals, be-
cause such classifications degrade the worth of individuals and ultimately
intensify social stigma.' Supporters of antisubordination, by contrast, resist
1. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe
specter of a permanent caste . . . presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides
itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.").
2. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
3. Id.
4. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. IReva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constituaional Stntuiles over Brown, 117 HARV. L REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004).
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the view that equal protection should be primarily understood as prohib-
iting certain classifications, and instead hold "the conviction that it is
wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social
status of historically oppressed groups."" Antisubordination broadly under-
stands certain classifications as sometimes permissible in order to
dismantle an entrenched status hierarchy.
Our readings of Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent have high stakes. Few
texts in American constitutional law have been so thoroughly trodden, or
so consistently misunderstood, in arguments over the meaning of equal
protection. Over the past twenty-five years, the opinion has become a
major fixture in contestation over the constitutionality of affirmative ac-
tion programs and other interventions to dismantle entrenched status
hierarchies in this country. Proponents of anticlassification have appropri-
ated Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy as support for the view that equal
protection embodies an aspiration to eliminate distinctions based on race,'
6. Id. This line of argument about the Equal Protection Clause is most often
traced to the contributions of Owen Fiss. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 5 PHIn. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). Recent contributions in this tradition
include, j.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2358 (1997); Reva B.
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997); Kenji Yo-
shino, Assintilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998). It is commonly accepted, however,
that the present-day Supreme Court has expressed its assent for anticlassification in its
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, although scholars continue to debate the
persistence of antisubordination values in equal protection doctrine. See, e.g., Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Shaw v. Keno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
7. Anita A. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L.
IREV. 781, 800 (2000).
8. See Alexander T. Aleinikoff, Re-Readiq' Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson:
Freedomn, Antiracisin, and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. KEV. 961, 961 (1992) ("Justice
Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson ... is seen as righteous and prophetic, announcing
the proper understanding of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
years ahead of its time."); Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity,
and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 988 (2007) ("Given the long and
sorry history of racial subordination in the United States, there is tremendous rhetorical
appeal to Justice John Marshall Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson that '[olur
constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.' ")
(quoting 163 U.S. at 559); see also, Molly Townes O'Brien, JusticeJohn Marshall Harlan as
Prophet: The Plessy Dissenter's Color-Blind Constitution, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753,
754 (1998) ("In his well-known dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice John Marshall Harlan
spoke with the voice of a prophet."). For a critique of such colorblind readings of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind,"
44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 ("A color-blind interpretation of the Constitution legitimates,
and thereby maintains, the social, economic, and political advantages that whites hold
over other Americans."); Frank R. Parker, Tie Datnaging Consequences of the Rehnquist
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and that Brown vindicated the ideal of colorblindness that Harlan first
proposed."
By turning to Harlan's dissent, conservative proponents of anticlassi-
fication draw upon history to lend authority to their claims about the
underlying commitment of our equality law. These invocations of Harlan's
dissent, however, rest on a perplexing form of historical authority that
eludes easy definition. Justice Harlan's opinion is a dissent, and therefore
cannot exert the force of binding precedent. These historical claims are
also not originalist, because they do not purport to affirmatively describe
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, or to reveal any-
thing about the intentions of its framers. Advocates for anticlassification,
many of whom are forceful proponents of originalism, depart from their
own methodology when they make arguments about the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The arguments they offer about the origins of
colorblind reasoning in Harlan's dissent rest instead on a narrative about
constitutional redemption, and a conception of the fundamental moral
commitments of the polity.
This Article explores these arguments and the sources of authority
on which they rest, and challenges them by offering a different account
of the central claims of Harlan's dissent. The history of"caste reasoning"
in our constitutional tradition provides a strong counterpoint to the an-
ticlassification reading of Harlan's dissent. Indeed, it makes any such
reading untenable. Re-reading Harlan's dissent in terms of the contro-
versies over slavery and segregation in the nineteenth century
demonstrates that by invoking caste, one realizes that the opinion drew
upon an existing and richly articulated set of arguments about the nature
of status-based harm.' The caste imagery deployed by abolitionists during
Court's Commitnut to Color-Blindness Versus Racial Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 773
(1996).
9. Krishnakumar, supra note 7, at 800 ("[T]he first judicial citation to the Plessy
dissent did not appear until 1961, and frequent quotation of the dissent did not com-
mence until the late 1980s.").
10. A number of commentators have noted the significance of the "caste" language,
but there has not been a sustained effort to trace its origins in the nineteenth century and
demonstrate its significance for Harlan's opinion. My effort to resuscitate the caste meta-
phor differs from existing contributions in its effort to reconstruct the meaning of caste in
the nineteenth century, as a means to shed light on Harlan's opinion. Jed Rubenfeld, for
example, has suggested that the image of "colorblindness" in Harlan's dissent must be
understood along with the image of "caste," but he does not substantially develop this
line of argument in the historical context of the decision or the nineteenth century, or of
the relationship of this lineage to debates over Brou. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affinnative Ac-
tion, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 460 (1997) ("[W]ithout caste, Justice Harlan's assertion of
constitutional colorblindness must be seized from its context, and his recognition of the
true constitutional evil of the legislation in Plessy must be suppressed. For Harlan's state-
ment of colorblindness was already a statement of the anticaste principle .. "). Garrett
Epps has also discussed some of the historical objections to Andrew Kull's reading ofJus-
tice Harlan's dissent, which emphasized its commitment to colorblindness, but Epps does
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the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment envisioned the harm of
slavery as involving the treatment of Blacks as a group and the effects of
prolonged oppression. Conservative proponents of anticlassification there-
fore perpetuate a fiction about the ideas contained in Justice Harlan's
dissent, and obscure the antisubordination values that were the central
concern of the caste metaphor in the nineteenth century.
This Article argues that interpreters who understand Harlan's dis-
senting opinion as standing for the anticlassification principle incorrectly
read the metaphor of caste, and arguably read it out of the opinion alto-
gether. It further contends that the caste image radically changes the
significance of the opinion in our equal protection tradition that warrants
reconsideration-and indeed a rejection-of the view that the opinion
endorses contemporary anticlassification reasoning.
The caste image had developed a particular set of meanings by the
time that Harlan returned to it in his dissent in Plessy. For the abolitionists
and the proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment during ratification,
caste was a nightmarish vision of a status hierarchy that expressed a deep
sense of the injustice of the subordination of groups within the social
structure. In light of this background, it is the articulation of antisubordi-
nation values in the opinion, and not colorblindness alone, that should
constitute its significance for debates over the content of our equality law.
Further, this Article takes issue with the claim made by advocates of co-
lorblind constitutionalism that Brown redeemed Plessy by adopting
Harlan's metaphor of colorblindness. The colorblind account of the con-
troversies over Brown ignores the arguments about caste, and their
not extensively discuss these objections, or attempt to uncover the meaning of caste over
the course of the nineteenth century. See Garrett Epps, Of Constitutional Seances and Color-
Blind Ghosts, 72 N.C. L. REV. 401, 417-426 (responding to Andrew Kull's argument that
Harlan's image of "colorblindness" is best understood as equivalent to the modern anti-
classification principle). Rebecca Scott has argued that Plessy must be understood in terms
of the idea of "public rights," and offered some discussion to the origins of the caste
metaphor in Louisiana, but did not substantially connect these claims to arguments about
interpretations ofJustice Harlan's image of "caste" or to the meaning of the term over the
course of the Nineteenth Century. See Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and
the Conceptual Roots of the Plessy Challenge, 106 MicH. L. REV. 777 (2008); see also infra
notes 90-95 and accompanying text. James E. Fleming has also suggested re-reading
Harlan's dissent in terms of an "anti-caste" principle, but offers no sustained historical
support for this account of the opinion. See James E. Fleming, Reuritinq Brown, Resurrect-
ing Plessy, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1141, 1145 (2005). Goodwin Liu has, however, argued
that Brown did not directly overrule Plessy on a colorblindness principle and suggested
that, in any case, "Harlan's words, read in context, show that he endorsed colorblindness
as an antidote to racial hierarchy, not to mere color-consciousness." Goodwin Liu, The
Meaning of Brown v. the Board, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2006, at A31. Hannah L. Weiner
has recently suggested has proposed an alternative reading ofJustice Harlan's dissent that
understands it as supporting the antisubordination position. Weiner, however, does not
address the significance of Harlan's invocation of caste. See Hannah L. Weiner, The Subor-
dinated Meaning of 'Color-Blind': HowJohn Marshall Harlan's Words Have Been Erroneously
Commandeered, 11 J.J. L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 45 (2009).
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connection to the nineteenth century tradition of such status-based
claims, which reemerged in debates over desegregation.
I must make several caveats at the outset. This Article does not offer
these historical materials in support of an originalist argument about the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment that would bind interpretations
of Equal Protection Clause to nineteenth century reasoning about caste."
Rather, by examining the origins of the caste metaphor, this Article takes
aim at the historical narrative on which the "colorblind" reading obtains
its authority, and challenges such a reading of Harlan's dissent as providing
support for the anticlassification position.'2 To the extent that it makes
historical arguments, this Article aims to reconstruct the reasoning about
caste that was available to Harlan and that informed his use of the term,
not to give an authoritative reading of the Equal Protection Clause.
I also do not seek to take the normative position that a principle
centered on the concept of caste is the correct ground for equal protec-
tion jurisprudence. The caste metaphor continues to have salience in
many other contexts in contemporary debates over the meaning of equal
protection. The metaphor has emerged in each of the recent affirmative
action cases, and continues to engender powerful feelings in debates over
efforts to promote greater equality in this country.
In the Michigan affirmative action cases, for example, Justice Gins-
burg recently invoked caste to describe the forms of subordination that
justified affirmative action programs.'3 In Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,Justice Breyer turned to caste to charac-
terize the system of status relations that our equal protection doctrine
aims to dismantle.'' Segregation, he wrote, had "perpetuated a caste sys-
11. For an influential argument of this kind, see Michael W. McConnell, Oisinal-
isn and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. R.EV. 947 (1995) (examining originalist
debates over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to support the view that it can
be reconciled with Brow v. Board of Education); see also Eric Schnapper, Affinnative Action
and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
12. In its effort to reconstruct nineteenth century ideas about caste, this Article
draws on the methodologies of intellectual history. As Noah Feldman has argued, "Intel-
lectual history has particular value in the context of constitutional thought because
constitutional discourse in the United States takes the form of reasoned argument about
ideas.. . . [T]o attempt to make sense of American constitutionalism requires an engage-
ment with the reasons people give and have given for the decisions they want to make."
Noah Feldman, Thie Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346,
428 (2002).
13. Gniter, 539 U.S. at 345 (2003) ("[lIt was only 25 years before Bakke that this
Court declared public school segregation unconstitutional, a declaration that, after pro-
longed resistance, yielded an end to a law-enforced racial caste system, itself the legacy of
centuries of slavery.") (emphasis added); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 299 ("In the wake 'of a sys-
tem of racial caste only recently ended,' large disparities endure.") (emphasis added)
(quoting Adarand Constnrctors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273 (1995)).
14. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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tern rooted in the institutions of slavery and ... legalized subordination.""
Additionally, a number of legal scholars have devoted a great deal of atten-
tion to the concept," and some have even argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment's central commitment is a principle that aims to eradicate
caste.'7 These arguments do not attempt to respond to anticlassification
readings of Harlan's dissent, and are thus not relevant to the claims made
here. I do not attempt to address the meaning of the caste metaphor for
equal protection more generally, and while keeping them in view, hope, as
much as possible, to leave these questions to future inquiries.
15. Id. at 2836.
16. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 6, at 151 ("The redistributive strategy could give ex-
pression to an ethical view against caste, one that would make it undesirable for any social
group to occupy a position of subordination for any extended period of time."); Guy B.
Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 93 (1941); Ken-
neth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 1-2
(1988) ("Equal citizenship has long been an American ideal ... [which emerged in the]
struggle to rid the nation of slavery and its system of racial caste ... Whatever else the
amendment may mean, it forbids a system of group subordination founded on race and
bearing the look of permanence."); Kenneth Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Fore-
word: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1977); see
also Epps, supra note 10; Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of Govern-
ment, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1326 (1994) (discussing the implications of caste in the
Establishment Clause context); Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: Fron
Jim Crow to Same-Sex Marriages, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 2456 (1994); Bryan K. Fair, The Anat-
omny of American Caste, 18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 381 (1999); Jeffrey Rosen, Kiryas
Joel and Shaw v. Reno: A Text-Bound Interpretativist Approach, 26 COMB. L. REV. 387
(1996); Jillian Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and Heteronortnativ-
ity, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY REV. 123 (2001). While the origins of caste have received little
attention, Carol A. Horton has recently provided a synthetic overview of "Anti-Caste
Liberalism" in the mid-nineteenth century. See CAROL A. HORTON, RACE AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 15-35 (2005). Horton generally locates the origins
of anti-caste liberalism in Reconstruction. Id. In Part I.A-I.B, by contrast, I suggest
that the origins of the caste metaphor can instead be found in the abolitionist move-
ment of the 1830s.
17. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Oqinal Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 315-16 (2007) (arguing that among the four principles underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment was a prohibition on "'caste' legislation, that is, legislation that created or
maintained a disfavored caste or subordinated a group through law .. "); Paul R.
Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle-Toward a Constitutional Standard for Review of Race
Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 3 (1983) ("[Ejach person has the right to be free from the
continuing effects of caste discrimination in the laws, programs, official decisions, gov-
ernment, and community affairs of these United States."); Kenneth Karst, The Supreme
Court 1976 Term, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1977) ("The principle of equal citizenship presumptively insists that the
organized society treat each individual as a person, one who is worthy of respect, one
who 'belongs.' Stated negatively, the principle presumptively forbids the organized society
to treat an individual either as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonpar-
ticipant."); Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411 (1994)
("[T]he anticaste principle forbids social and legal practices from translating highly visible
and morally irrelevant differences into systemic social disadvantage, unless there is a very
good reason for society to do so.").
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This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I examines the rhetoric
about colorblindness in contemporary disagreements over the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the historical narrative about Harlan's
dissent on which they rest. Part II explores how the caste metaphor
emerged in abolitionist writings about slavery and in early challenges to
segregation. Part III examines the use of the caste metaphor in floor de-
bates over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in the late
nineteenth century. Part IV turns to the significance of caste during the
Plessy litigation, and offers an alternative reading of the opinion that ac-
counts for the tradition of caste reasoning with which Harlan would have
been familiar.'8
Part V revisits debates over desegregation, and examines the signifi-
cance of caste reasoning in the period before Brown and in the decision's
aftermath. By tracing the caste metaphor in the struggles over Brown, this
Part also suggests serious problems with the anticlassification argument
that situates a relationship between Brown and Harlan's dissent. The Con-
clusion explores what significance the caste metaphor in Harlan's dissent
might reveal about the relationships between antisubordination and anfi-
classification values in the equal protection tradition.
I.THE PROPHETICVOICE: HARLAN'S DISSENT AND DEBATES OVER
ANTICLASSIFICATION VALUES
In debates over the meaning of the equal protection guarantee, sup-
porters of anticlassification have seized hold of Harlan's dissent. These
proponents of anticlassification have turned to Harlan's image of a color-
blind Constitution to argue that anticlassification is the most basic
commitment of equal protection law. This Part illustrates the ways in
which proponents of anticlassification have invoked Harlan's opinion and
identifies the historical claims on which their arguments rest.
Invocations of Justice Harlan exert an exotic force in these dis-
agreements, because they rest on a perplexing form of authority that is
ultimately historical in nature, but that is not in any meaningful sense
originalist. The importance of Harlan's dissent to anticlassification argu-
ments rests, instead, on a historical narrative about the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment in our constitutional tradition.The uses and mis-
uses of Harlan's dissent in anticlassification reasoning reflect the struggles
over its meaning that exerts powerful authority as a form of collective
self-understanding in constitutional politics and in our political practice.
18. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE.
L.J. 1281, 1289-90 (1991).
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A. The Anticlassification Position
Proponents of the anticlassification principle understand the basic
commitment of the Equal Protection Clause as prohibiting invidious clas-
sification on the basis of certain protected characteristics. In their view,
the effort to end the injustice of entrenched social hierarchy requires the
elimination of official recognition of these categories." This position was
recently summarized by Chief Justice Robert's bold assertion in Parents'
Involved that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race."
2
"
Anticlassification is concerned with the harm inflicted on individu-
als when they are categorized on the basis of their race, which is the
stigma expressed by the state that all that matters about them is their race.
While both the anticlassification and antisubordination are concerned
with the problem of putting an end to social hierarchies based on such
categories, anticlassification fears that by boldly intervening in ways that
take account of race or of gender, we amplify and entrench these harms
rather ending them. As Justice Kennedy put it in Rice v. Cayetano, "One of
the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it
demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry in-
stead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities."2 ' Indeed, "[a]n
inquiry into ancestral lines is not consistent with respect based on the
unique personality each of us possesses, a respect the Constitution itself
secures in its concern for person and citizens."--
Antisubordination departs from anticlassification in that it under-
stands the problem of racial or gender subordination as demanding deep
and profound interventions by the state in order to end this social injus-
tice.While both antisbordination and anticlassification are concerned with
the problem of social hierarchy, the antisubordination position takes the
view that there is a constitutional and moral imperative for powerful
structural remedies to end it.2-' It understands that there are costs with
such remedies, but argues that such costs are a necessary sacrifice that
19. See Reva Siegel & Jack Balkin, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassifica-
tion or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10-13 (2004).
20. 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007); see Deborah Hastings, White Man's Burden, Dis-
crinination Suits Flourish, AP, Apr. 13, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090428/
ap..on re us/usreversediscrimination (last visited Apr. 13, 2010); llya Shaprio, The
Way to Stop Discrimination on the Basis of Race is to Stop Discriminating on the Basis of Race,
CATO @ LIBERTY, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/04/22/ricci-v-destafano/ (last
visited May 23, 2009).
21. 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000).
22. Id.
23. See Fiss, supra note 6, at 109.
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must be borne by a polity which seeks to create a more just social order.4
Antisubordination thus conceptualizes a different relationship between
the Constitution and such status hierarchies. It suggests that the Four-
teenth Amendment acknowledges the existence of such hierarchies and
seeks to end them. It is not, in other words, blind to them. The antisubor-
dination position takes notice of them and willingly allows the law to take
shape in response to them and to trace their contours.
The anticlassification position involves certain doctrinal entailments.
If the Equal Protection Clause is understood to prohibit classification of
individuals on the basis of their race, their gender, or their membership in
some other protected class, then many efforts to dismantle these status
hierarchies are constitutionally impermissible..2 ' The most obvious exam-
ple of such a remedy is affirmative action-which by one account is
morally justified as a structural intervention aimed at dismantling racial hi-
erarchy-is constitutionally impermissible. The most powerful support for
anticlassification has gained strength in response to affirmative action pro-
grams, which have come under attack from conservatives for the way they
supposedly promote racial inequality rather than ending it.2'
Another example of such a remedy are the majority/minority dis-
tricts in the voting rights area, which their supporters argue help to
facilitate representation and political engagement within a minority
group.-7 Proponents of anticlassification also would strike down these dis-
tricts, because of the way that they entrench racial divisions that
underscore the harm of race rather than putting it behind us. antisubordi-
nation, by contrast, would argue that the fuller participation and that they
provide to minority communities not only enhances their reputation but
appreciably improves our process of political contestation in ways that,
24. See Owen M. Fiss, Affinnative Action as a Strategy of Justice, 17 PHIL & PUB.
POL'Y 37, 38 (1997) ("[A]ffirmative action should be seen as a strategy ofjustice, though
more a means of distributive rather than corrective, justice[.] I acknowledge that this
strategy undeniably works its own wrongs."); Owen Fiss, What Should Be Done for Those
Who Have Been Left Behind?, in A WAY OUT: AMERICA'S GHETTOS AND THE LEGACY OF
RACIsM 3 (Joshua Cohen et al., eds., 2003).
25. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
26. Gntter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution abhors
classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can hami favored races
or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places
citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits,
it demeans us all.").
27. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649-50 (1993) ("Classifying citizens by race, as
we have said, threatens special harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases. It
therefore warrants different analysis."); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
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over the long run, address the problem of race by enriching the quality of
political debate and engagement with our most basic values.28
Proponents of anticlassification turn to Justice Harlan's dissent be-
cause, in their view, it offers a forceful response to efforts by the state to
dismantle status hierarchies. They turn to the colorblindness rationale to
underscore the intolerable harms that these interventions perpetuate on
the polity and assert that the basic commitment of the Fourteenth
Amendment refuses to see such divisions of race. As a doctrinal matter,
anticlassification, as expressed in the metaphor of colorblindness, envisions
a particular relationship between the law and structures of social hierarchy
that says that our laws will not take notice of such divisions, because of
the ways that the law's consciousness of them denigrates the social order
by reducing the worth of individuals to the color of their skin.
B. The Rise of "Colorblindness" Rhetoric and the
Revriting of Harlan ' Dissent
For supporters of anticlassification, the metaphor of colorblindness
has taken on great significance as description of the harm of classifying
individuals on the basis of their membership in certain groups and the
aspiration to finally end these harms. This rhetoric about colorblindness
can be traced to recent debates over the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 ' Scholars have found that the rhetoric of colorblindness did
not emerge and gain its present rhetorical force in these exchanges until
the late 1970s and early 1980s. 3' Ian Haney L6pez, for example, has re-
cently suggested that talk of colorblindness first entered our constitutional
politics in the 1980s, and has emphasized on the significance of Harlan's
dissent for proponents of this interpretation of equal protection. Over
the last quarter of the twentieth century, these arguments began to take
on new force when, as L6pez argues, anticlassification was transformed
28. Heather Gerken has suggested, with the concept of "second-order diversity,"
that such districts improve the quality and richness of democratic dialogue. See Heather
K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity and Disaggregated Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099,
1104 (2005) ("[Slecond-order diversity provides a richer, more textured view of the de-
mocratic order. If every decisionmaking [sic] body mirrored the population, as with first-
order diversity, we would expect the decisions rendered roughly to mirror the preferences
of the median voter. By avoiding the push to the middle in every case, heterogeneity
among decisionmaking bodies reveals the views of the full democratic spectrum.").
29. Aleinikoff, supra note 8, at 973 ("Harlan's opinion has received prominent play
in the conservative attack on race-conscious policies."); Brad Snyder, How the Conserva-
tives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 485 ("Scalia and
Thomas view Harlan's dissent as proof that we have a color-blind constitution.").
30. Krishnakumar, supra note 7, at 800.
31. See L6pez, supra note 8, at 985.
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into colorblindness rhetoric that "accords race-conscious remedies and
racial subjugation the same level of constitutional hostility.'
-2
The first modern citations to Justice Harlan's dissent were by liberals
who invoked the metaphor to strike down Jim Crow laws, and later, in
support of affirmative action programs. In Garner v. Louisiana, decided
1961, which involved the segregation of lunch counters, Justice Douglas
invoked the metaphor of colorblindness in Harlan's decision in the last
sentence of his concurrence. Douglas cited the opinion to defend his
view that "there is the overriding constitutional requirement that all state
power be exercised so as not to deny equal protection to any group. '34 In
these early citations, the idea of "colorblindness" was not yet closely asso-
ciated with the prohibition of all legal distinctions based on race. Harlan's
dissent could thus be cited without qualms by liberals like Douglas to
support affirmative action and other programs that the dissent would later
be invoked to oppose.
Conservatives began to appropriate Justice Harlan's colorblindness
metaphor in the heated controversies over affirmative action that began in
the late 1970s and early 1980s.3" In the course of these struggles, conser-
vative opponents of affirmative action began to find that Harlan's dissent
had a great deal of rhetorical force, and that it could lend authority to
their efforts to end such programs. The first citation to Justice Harlan's
dissent in the affirmative action context was Justice Brennan's explicit re-
jection of arguments made by the parties that Harlan's dissent rested on a
colorblind rationale.""
Responding to rhetoric that the Constitution should be understood
to embrace colorblindness, Justice Brennan wrote, "the shorthand phrase
'[o]ur Constitution is color-blind' ... has never been adopted by this
Court as the proper meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, we
have expressly rejected this proposition on a number of occasions. 3 9 "No
decision of this Court," he emphasized, "has ever adopted the proposition
that the Constitution must be colorblind."' In Bakke, the liberal members
of the Court strongly resisted these assertions about the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause and wrote in response to conservatives who had
32. Id. at 988.
33. 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Richard A. Primus,
Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 246 n.17 (1998) (an account of
the emergence of citations ofJustice Harlan's opinion in the Supreme Court).
34. Gamer, 368 U.S. at 185 (Douglas, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. See Primus, supra note 33, at 246 n.17.
37. See Siegal, supra note 19, at 30-31.
38. See Primus, supra note 33, at 246 n.17.
39. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355-56 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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latched onto the phrase as a powerful statement of their position. The
metaphor had begun to occupy a privileged place in these controversies
that reached the core of the equal protection tradition.4'
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, which involved the constitutionality of
Congress's use of the spending power to correct past discrimination, Jus-
tice Stewart invoked Harlan's dissent to support an equal protection
rationale of colorblindness.4 2 In the first sentence of his dissent, Stewart
referenced Harlan's dissent to situate his position with respect to debates
over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment:
"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tol-
erates classes among citizens. The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or of his color...."Those
words were written by a Member of this Court 84 years ago
[in] Plessy v. Ferguson.... [And] today's decision is wrong for
43the same reason that Plessy v. Ferguson was wrong....
From this starting point, Stewart reasoned that among the funda-
mental protections under the Fourteenth Amendment was a prohibition
of"invidious discrimination. ' 4 4 "Under our Constitution" Stewart argued,
"any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race
or ethnic origin is inherently suspect and presumptively invalid., 45 In
Stewart's account of the significance of Harlan's dissent, it was the nation's
widely shared and longstanding commitment to this principle that gave it
force.
During the 1980s, the principle of constitutional colorblindness had
come to characterize debates in the popular press about the basic com-
mitments of the Constitution. In 1984, in the New York Times, William
Bradford Reynolds, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights
Division in the Department of Justice, argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment should be understood as resting on a colorblindness princi-
ple. 16 Reynolds argued that such a principle should be read to prohibit
"quotas" based on race of all kinds:
[T]he N.A.A.C.P... maintained in Brown: "That the Consti-
tution is colorblind is our dedicated belief." . . That argument
prevailed and in what may be the Supreme Court's finest hour,
a unanimous Court overturned the separate-but-equal doc-
trine of Plessy v. Ferguson and adopted the view of the lone
41. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
42. 448 U.S. 448, 552-53 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 522-23 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 523.
45. Id.
46. William Bradford Reynolds, Letter to the Editor, Racial Quotas Hurt Blacks and
the Constitution, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1985, at A22.
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dissenter in that case, the elder Justice Harlan. In any consid-
eration of the Constitution, Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy
invariably emerges as the definitive statement of the proper
construction of the 14th Amendment. "Our Constitution is
47
colorblind," he wrote....
In the debates over affirmative action, the contours of the anticlassi-
fication reading of Harlan's opinion had begun to take shape, and the
opinion began to exert a strong influence in these discussions. Out of de-
bates over affirmative action, Justice Harlan's dissent took a privileged
place in a story about the tragedy and redemption of America's struggle
with race, and as a statement of its most basic and important values.
C.Justice ScaliaJustice Thomas, and the Underpinnings
of Colorblind Constitutionalism
By the late 1980s, the colorblindness metaphor had become a stan-
dard trope in anticlassification arguments. Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas have relied strongly on Harlan's dissent as support for the view
that the colorblindness rationale has a long and distinguished history.4 " In
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., decided in 1989, the Court considered
a challenge to a program implemented by the City of Richmond,
Virginia, which required that 30 percent of the subcontracts in contracts
negotiated by the City be granted to minority contractors.' The Court
struck down the plan under strict scrutiny, finding that it was not sup-
ported by a compelling governmental interest and not narrowly tailored. "
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia invoked Harlan's image of colorblindness
to underscore that the distinct constitutional problem in the plan was one
of classification on the basis of race:
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination
is as nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from
our society the source of those effects, which is the tendency-
fatal to a Nation such as ours-to classify and judge men and
women on the basis of their country of origin or the color of
their skin .... At least where state or local action is at issue,
only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger
to life and limb-for example, a prison race riot, requiring tem-
porary segregation of inmates ... can justify an exception to
47. Id.
48. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. kEv. 791, 791 (1996)
(concluding that Scalia and Thomas are "committed ... to the principle that government
can almost never classify citizens on the basis of race ... ").
49. 488 U.S. 468, 477 (1989). See also L6pez, supra note 8, at 1047.
50. Croson, 448 U.S. at 511.
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the principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that
"[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tol-
erates classes among citizens.""
Scalia's invocation of Harlan's dissent is typical of the ways in which the
metaphor has been invoked in support of a colorblindness principle. The
dissent functions as a rhetorical flourish in this paragraph, and gives
Scalia's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment a strong foothold in the
history of argumentation over its meaning.
The metaphor continues to be a forceful statement of the anticlassi-
fication position in the Court, especially in cases involving affirmative
action or so-called "race-conscious" remedies. Among the current mem-
bers of the Court, Justice Thomas is perhaps the strongest advocate of
colorblindness. In particular, Thomas has drawn on the historical lineage
of the colorblindness principle to support his view that it should govern
our readings of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Parents Involved, Justice Thomas launched a staunch defense of the
anticlassification position, and took aim at the dissenters who "reject[ed]
... the color-blind Constitution. "I am quite comfortable in the com-
pany I keep," Thomas wrote, because "[m]y view of the Constitution is
Justice Harlan's view in Plessy ... And my view was the rallying cry for
the lawyers who litigated Brown.' 13 Thomas further cited remarks by Judge
Thomas J. Motley regarding the significance of Harlan's dissent: "[Justice
Marshall] had a 'Bible' to which he turned during his most depressed
moments. The 'Bible' would be known in the legal community as the first
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. I do not know of any
opinion which buoyed Marshall more in his pre-Brown days." 4 In his
quotation of Harlan, Justice Thomas actually reproduces the sentence
before, about the "classes of citizens," and the sentence about "colorblind-
ness," but leaves the intervening sentence about "caste" out of the
quotation."
51. Id. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
52. Parents Involved in Cnty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772
(Thomas, J., concurring). On the use of colorblind rhetoric in Parents hIvolved, see Jona-
than I. Entin, Parents Involved and the Meaning of Brown: An Old Debate Renewed, 31
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 923 (2008); see also Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Do-
mains of Equal Protection, 121 HARv. L. REV. 104, 113-22 (2007).
53. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 772 (Thomas,J., concurring).
54. Id. at 773 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting In Memoriam, Honorable Thur-
good Marshall: Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United
States, p. X (Nov. 15, 1993)) (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 780 (Thomas, J., concurring). Despite the length of the quotation, Justice
Thomas conspicuously omits the caste language from Harlan's opinion.
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so
it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So,
I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time .... But in view of the
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Justice Thomas's position in Parents Involved thus rests on an unusual
claim about its authoritativeness. First, his use of the dissent seems to have
very little to do with any possible originalist claim about the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The appeal he makes, instead, seems to in-
volve a broad reference to a historical narrative that connects the meaning
of the dissent to our constitutional tradition in two different ways. The
first assertion is that Justice Harlan's dissent articulated a version of the
"colorblindness" rationale, and the second is that this rationale has been
perpetuated in our constitutional tradition in debates over the meaning of
the equal protection guarantee. By referencing Harlan's dissent, Thomas
gives this reading added historical support, but it is historical support of a
perplexing kind. By connecting the image of colorblindness in Harlan's
dissent to Brown, Thomas offers a particular vision of the history of our
constitutional politics that supports an understanding of colorblindness as
the strand in a story of redemption that connects Plessy to Brown.56 The
basis for that redemption, however, is not rooted in any particular inter-
pretive methodology, and draws its authority from a more confusing and
elusive source.
To support anticlassification readings of the Fourteenth Amendment,
litigants in the Supreme Court frequently turn to Justice Harlan's image
of colorblindness. These litigants stress this narrative in order to support
their claims.The citations to Harlan's opinion typically leave out the caste
language, and have tended to cite only that portion of the opinion that
discusses the "color-blind" Constitution. In nearly every major case rest-
ing on an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause since the 1980s,
conservative groups have turned to the arguments in Harlan's dissent as
support for anticlassification values, and cited that sentence of the opinion
advancing "colorblindness" in whole or in paraphrase. 7 These briefs typi-
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens .... Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.
Id.
56. On the possibility of constitutional "redemption," see Jack M. Balkin, Original
Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007). See also Ronald
R. Garet, Judges as Prophets: A Coverian Interpretation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 390-91
(1999) (describing Justice Harlan as a judicial "prophet" and as belonging, in Robert
Cover's phrase, within "a canon of the 'folktales of justice'"). These invocations of
Harlan's dissent involve claims that Philip Bobbit classifies as resting on an appeal to narra-
tive "ethos" that address the nature of American democracy. See PHILIP C. BOBBIT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 93-177 (1984).
57. E.g., Brief Anicus Curiae of Ward Connerly in Support of Petitioners at 7,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 164184
("'Our Constitution is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens.' . . . In Brown a unanimous Court adopted Justice Harlan's color-blind view and
repudiated Plessy) (citations omitted); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Claremont Institute
Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence In Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
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cally leave out the "caste" image, and focus instead on the prophetic invo-
cation of colorblindness that, the argument goes, were eventually adopted
by the Court in Brown. In the most recent reverse discrimination case be-
fore the Court, Ricci v. DeStefano, proponents of anticlassification have
again turned to Harlan's dissent as an authoritative source of the values
that they support.!
D. Andrew KIl and the History of Colorblind Reasoning
Among legal scholars, Andrew Kull is perhaps the strongest propo-
nent of a colorblind reading of the Fourteenth Amendment." Because of
the influence of these arguments as proponents of the anticlassification
position, it is important to evaluate them and consider the historical
claims on which they are based. Kull argues that Harlan's dissent must be
situated within nineteenth century arguments that favor a nondiscrimina-
tion principle." Kull understands Harlan's dissent as instantiating in the
equal protection tradition a colorblind principle that carries forward the
nineteenth century history of arguments about anticlassification."' "Plessy
embodies both our constitutional law of racial discrimination and its
7-8, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2002 WL 32101034
("Alone in dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan eloquently penned the judicial equivalent
of the Declaration's creed .... Fifty-eight years later, in Browln and its progeny, this Court
repudiated Plessy's separate but equal doctrine and ultimately renewed America's dedica-
tion to what Martin Luther King would later describe as his dream.") (citations omitted);
Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et al. in Support of Petitioner at 7, Ada-
rand Contractors v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (No. 00-730), 2001 WL 648599
("Justice Harlan's vision of color-blind equality before the law would not prevail until
Brown, 58 years later. In Brown, this Court repudiated Plessy and 'acknowledged the in-
vidious effect of separating individuals solely because of their race.' ") (citations omitted)
(quoting Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1073 (Cal.
2000)); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et al. in Support of Petitioner at
8, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2006) (No.
05-908), 2006 WL 2430578 (quoting Justice Scalia's discussion in Croson of Harlan's dis-
sent); Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3-4, Parents Involved in Cnlty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2006) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 3381292 ("In Plessy, only Justice
Harlan foresaw that reading the Equal Protection Clause to allow state-sanctioned race
discrimination would 'have no other result than to render permanent peace impossible,'
Justice Harlan was right.").
58. E.g., Brief of Amnicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence In Support of Petitioners at 9, Ricci v. DeStefano, 126 S. Ct. 2658 (2009)
(Nos. 07-1428, 08-328), 2009 WL 507011.
59. See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 222 (1992) ("A scrupu-
lous nondiscrimination may yet prove, because of the limitations of human justice, to be
the most effective contribution that lawu ... can make to the achievement of racial equal-
ity in this country.") (emphasis in original).
60. See id. at 22-53.
61. Id. at 2 ("The color-blind argument was the product of the struggle for legal
equality for Black Americans ... and it was discovered nearly at the outset.").
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antithesis, crystallized in Justice Harlan's dissent" Kull argues, "and the
legacy of the case is the choice it presents us.''- "With Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion, the color-blind constitution became one of the avail-
able meanings of the Fourteenth Amendment," he continues, and
"Harlan's luminous opinion gave lasting form to an idea that malight not
otherwise survived him. ,63 Kull marshals a great deal of historical analysis
of nineteenth and twentieth century materials to illustrate the long pedi-
gree of arguments about colorblindness.
The key turn in Kull's argument is that nineteenth century argu-
ments about discrimination can be best interpreted as equivalent to the
colorblind principle as it is now understood by conservative opponents of
affirmative action . Such a view rests on a particular reading of the nine-
teenth century materials that emphasizes their commitment to
anticlassification values." Although he does not devote a great deal of at-
tention to the term, Kull reads the caste language in these debates as
support for anticlassification. His central argument, however, turns on the
use of the term "discrimination" and "distinction" in these materials, as an
early articulation of Harlan's idea of colorblindness."
Although he acknowledges that the Court did not fully adopt a co-
lorblind reading of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown, ' Kull suggests
that that the "briefs and arguments filed in the School Segregation Cases
crystallized the legal position of the civil rights movement for the period
when its avowed legal objective was a color-blind Constitution.,6" "Taken
together," Kull continues, "they represent the high-water mark of the at-
tempt to persuade the Court to adopt Justice Harlan's view of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 While Kull falls substantially short of giving
an account of Brown as having redeemed Justice Harlan's reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment, he does stress the significance of colorblind ar-
guments in attempting to persuade the Court that colorblindness was the
correct ground for overruling Plessy.'"
62. Id. at 118.
63. Id. at 118-19.
64. Id. at 40-87.
65. Kull, however, does not use the term "anticlassification" anywhere in the book,
and instead prefers the termu "nondiscrimination" which he equates with "colorblindness."
Id. at 2.
66. Id. at 43 ("If we can agree that a caste society is bad, then segregation is to be
condemned without inquiring into the equality of segregated facilities or the harm (by
stigma or otherwise) to class members.").
67. See id. at 151.
68. Id. at 156.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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E.Justice Harlan and the Uses of History
The arguments that conservative proponents of anticlassification
have made about Harlan's dissent rest on a strange form of authority. As a
dissent, it does not carry the authority of binding law, and its authority
must come from some other source. It is not clear therefore why his dis-
sent would be such an obvious authoritative ground-with such
rhetorical power-for the principle of colorblindness.
The authority of the dissent in these arguments is also not in any
sense originalist. Many commentators have noted the inconsistencies be-
tween originalism's claim to locate constitutional meaning in a stable and
ascertainable past, and the extent to which the meanings it actually pro-
vides have emerged from the pressures of popular constitutionalism in the
present.' Despite their professed support for originalism, Scalia and
Thomas are perhaps least originalist when explicating the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' - Their arguments about Harlan's dissent, and
potentially about the Fourteenth Amendment in general, radically depart
from the originalist reading." They do not purport to argue that the "co-
lorblindness" image in Harlan's dissent is in any way related to the original
meaning or the original intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Justice Harlan's dissent makes a poor candidate for the originalist
method. It was written more than 20 years after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Harlan made no assertions that his argument
71. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalismn as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192-93 (2008) (arguing that "Heller's originalism en-
forces understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged in the late twentieth
century through popular constitutionalism. It situates originalism's claim to ground judi-
cial decisionmaking outside of politics in the constitutional politics of the late twentieth
century, and demonstrates how Heller respects claims and compromises forged in social
movement conflict over the right to bear arms in the decades after Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation."). See also Robert Post & Reva Seigel, Originalisii as a Political Practice: The Right's
Living' Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006) (describing originalism as a founda-
tion for conservative political mobilization); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Medellin and
Orninalistn, 68 MD. L. REV. 377, 380-82 (2009).
72. See Antonin Scalia, Commnon Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the
United States Federal Courts in Interpretin the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTER-
PRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND TlE LAW 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) ("What I look
for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the
text .. "); Clarence Thonias, Judgqin, 45 U. KAN L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1996).
73. See Andr6 Douglas Pond Cummings, Grutter v. Bollinger, Clarence Thomas,
Affinnative Action and the Treachy of Oriinalismn: "77ie Sun Don't Shine Here in This Part of
Town", 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER LJ. 1, 4-5 (2005) ("Clarence Thomas abandons his
originalist jurisprudential philosophy whenever it fits his political and emotional agenda.
He does this in his race jurisprudence and he does it again in Gntter."). See also Book
Note, Justice Tlomas's Inconsistent Oriinalisin, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1431, 1432-33 (2008)
(reviewing CLARENCE THOMAS, My GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR (2007)).
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about colorblindness rested on any interpretation of such sources. Even if
there were some plausible connection between Harlan's dissent and the
Fourteenth Amendment, scholars have convincingly shown that the de-
bates over the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment would not
support a narrow reading of the Amendment that focused on "color-
blindness."74
A different claim about the relevance of Harlan's dissent might rest
on the idea of a constitutional canon-or, specifically, a canonical dissent
in an anti-canonical case-of certain fundamental texts that articulate
widely shared and foundational principles in our constitutional tradition. 7s
The argument about constitutional canon seems to make a more limited
claim than do Scalia and Thomas. Canonicity describes the relationship
among the central texts in our constitutional tradition, and in that sense
points to the way in which Brown and Harlan's dissent are placed in a new
relationship in these arguments. 7" But arguments about canonicity do not
seek, as the colorblindness argument does, to speak to the content of the
Fourteenth Amendment in such general terms. Canonicity thus explains
part of the way that conservatives use the dissent, but it does not tell the
full story.
Colorblindness readings of Harlan's dissent turn to history for a dif-
ferent sort of authority than either originalism or canonicity.They turn to
history, not as binding authority, as it is in originalism, or as a source of
relationships among texts, but instead as a narrative about the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment as it has come to be in our collective strug-
gles over past injustice.7 They rest, in other words, on profound and
elemental collective memory about the reconstruction of our polity in
74. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
292-93 (2007) (relying on an account of original understanding to suggest that the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits "class legislation"); McConnell, supra note 11.
75. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Cannons of Constitutional Lanw, 111
HARV. L. REV. 963, 1019 (1998) (describing Plessy as a fundamental example of an anti-
canonical text); see also Primus, supra note 33, at 245 ("When a modern lawyer thinks of
Lochner or Plessy, however, he does not think only of their majority opinions. Each of
those cases also contains a famous dissent, and those dissents have in some respects
eclipsed the majority opinions.").
76. See Balkin, supra note 75, at 968.
77. See Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 343 (2001) ("[lit is plain that in our consti-
tutional culture we also turn to history as a source of narrative understanding. It is history
that supplies the narrative materials through which we forge the collective subject-'We
the People'-that is realized through the practice of constitutional argument; and it is
history that supplies the field of collective experience through which we make pragmatic
judgments about how to realize constitutional commitments and values in practice. This
kind of appeal to history, as a source of narrative understanding, of collective identity, and
of practical judgment about constitutional values, is a fundamental feature of our constitu-
tional culture, regularly invoked in constitutional argument inside and outside the
courts.").
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the aftermath of slavery. The colorblind reading of the opinion expresses
one conception of the normative commitments that have emerged from
these struggles, and that gain authority from their relationship to these
shared commitments."'
Colorblindness arguments understand Harlan's dissent as drawing
upon, and articulating, a strand of dissent that was present at its historical
moment; and then contributing that protest to our constitutional culture
at the moment that the blight of Plessy was put there. As Justice Thomas
argues in Parents Involved, advocates of desegregation then redeemed the
colorblindness principle that Harlan first articulated and gave it expression
in our law when the Court decided Brown and based the decision on a
colorblind reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
Justice Harlan's dissent thus forms part of a narrative about the his-
tory of debates over the content of our Constitution that gives them
legitimacy in the present. Such a view of history helps to link the past to
the present through a shared understanding of our normative commit-
merits that imagines the nation as engaged in a shared experience of
constitutional redemption." The narrative powerfully connects our mo-
ment of constitutional resurrection-Brown--with the moment of its
deepest disgrace, and holds that Justice Harlan foresaw the most significant
harms of segregation and articulated a constitutional principle that would
ultimately end them.
A narrative about our collective struggles over the constitution's
meaning is the most significant source of the authority of Harlan's dissent
in colorblindness reasoning. It is a narrative that entices us to believe in
the aspirations and possibilities of constitutional law for overcoming past
injustice, and that locates a story of redemption in the wake of slavery and
segregation an aspect of our shared identity and self-understanding as a
nation."' Norman Spaulding has suggested that the keconstruction
Amendments present particular challenges as courts struggle to apply
them to new situations, because they were written to expressly repudiate
historical wrongs, and has detailed the ways that collective memory shapes
78. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 42 (1983)
("To state ... that the problem is one of too much law is to acknowledge the nomic
integrity of each of the communities that have generated principles and precepts. It is to
posit that each 'community of interpretation' that has achieved 'law' has its own nomos-
narratives, experiences, and visions to which the norm articulated is the right response.").
79. See supra notes 52-55.
80. See Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Orkinalistn's Dead Hand-In Theory and Practice, 56
UCLA L. REv. 1399 (2009).
81. Benedict Anderson has developed a conception of a nation as "an imagined
political community" which, "regardless of actual inequality and exploitation that may
prevail ... is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship." BENEDICT ANDERSON,
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6-7
(2d ed. 2006).
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courts' interpretations of them. 2 These invocations of Harlan rest on
forms of collective memory that reconstructs our past and that gives it
meaning and moral authority as we attempt to make it relevant to the
challenges and political struggles that we face in the present.
The claims made in support of a colorblind reading of Harlan's dis-
sent therefore turn centrally on a particular reading of it as a historical
text and of a narrative about our struggles over the meaning of our con-
stitutional values, and to reconstruct our basic normative commitments
out of the ashes of past injustice. 3 In the story that proponents of color-
blindness tell about the dissent, the opinion had a settled meaning in its
nineteenth century context that gave the content of its protest to Plessy
striking force, and that meaning rested on "colorblindness." It was this
meaning that was later elaborated and embraced and in the struggles lead-
ing up to Brown and that forms the content the Equal Protection Clause.
The next Part proceeds from the nineteenth century and to the
twentieth century history of the Brown litigation to challenge the peculiar
use of history in these arguments to support a colorblind reading of
Harlan's opinion. It offers a new reading of the opinion based on a differ-
ent account of the meaning of "caste" in the opinion, and considers the
consequences of this history for locating the significance of Harlan's dis-
sent in the equal protection tradition.
The Article challenges this narrative about the dissent, first, by re-
constructing the history of debates about social inequality that rested on
the metaphor of caste, and that formed the background to Harlan's claim
that "[t]here is no caste here." The Article then argues that the possible
links between Harlan's dissent and Brown in terms of the caste metaphor,
and that view that the relationship between Brown and Harlan's prophecy
rests on the colorblind argument ignores the resurgence of caste, and its
attendant antisubordination reasoning, in debates over desegregation.
I hope to offer a revisionist history that challenges the narrative that
proponents of anticlassification have buried. The Article posits a different
understanding of the relationship between our contemporary disagree-
ments about equal protection and the history of reasoning about status
hierarchies in the nineteenth century that inform readings of Justice
Harlan's opinion. From the perspective afforded by this history, it is possi-
82. See Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countcntonunent: Federalism, Recon-
stnction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLuM. L. REV. 1992, 2000 (2003)
("[Tlhe Reconstruction Amendments represent self-conscious attempts to publicly address
the fact of historical injustice through higher law-making.... Even if the original text of
the Constitution was written against the perceived defects of the Articles of Confedera-
tion and the abuses of colonial domination, it's clear and ambitious break with that past
eases the work of memory.").
83. Prinmus, supra note 33, at 289 ("To see how the received reading of the re-
deemed Plessy dissent is a significant reimagining of that opinion, it is necessary to read
Harlan's dissent as a nineteenth-century contemporary would have.").
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ble to reimagine the relationship between anticlassification and antisubor-
dination values in our tradition that takes seriously their common roots,
and to appreciate the persistence of antisubordination values in the equal
protection tradition from the nineteenth century to the present.
E The Problem of Caste in Abolitionist Rhetoric and
Republican Ideology, 1830-1865
In readings of the opinion by supporters of anticlassification,
Harlan's invocation of colorblindness dominates the analysis, or the image
of caste is left out altogether. In these readings, the salience of caste for
nineteenth century readers is lost. When he proclaimed, "There is no caste
here," Harlan drew on a tradition of arguing about status-hierarchies in
the United States as a form of the subordination of groups that was nearly
sixty years old. The caste metaphor can be heard loudly in decades before
the Civil War and in abolitionist rhetoric about slavery.
Abolitionists and other critics of slavery seized caste as powerful
rhetoric to describe the harms caused by the slave system and the racial
hierarchy that it imposed. From the perspective of political actors before
the Civil War, the distinct problem posed by caste was that it relegated
whole groups in society to a form of inescapable subordination. The high
value placed on economic mobility and on free labor was understood to
be a glaring contrast to the entrenched hierarchy that was strongly associ-
ated with caste systems. To these observers, the most troubling aspect of
caste was not that it classified individuals, but that it imposed unjust and
lasting forms of subjugation.
The social order imposed by caste was so firmly entrenched, these
arguments suggested, that whatever means would be necessary to end it
might very well need to be invasive and powerful. The problem of caste
perpetuated by slavery was so ancient and so firmly rooted that efforts to
demolish it would be protracted, difficult, and painful.
G. Abolitionist Rhetoric and the "Prejudice of Caste"
Beginning in the 1830s, members of the antislavery societies in New
England frequently deployed the term "caste" as the distinctive feature of
slavery in the United States, and the experience of free Blacks in the
North. Caste became a metaphor that had rhetorical stakes, because it
clarified the social harms associated with conditions under slavery. In the
context of these debates, caste began to take on a particular meaning as an
image of the social hierarchy under slavery that had emotional resonance
and political salience.
In the course of reporting an account of a free Black woman's trial
in Massachusetts, an author writing in The Abolitionist in 1831, argued that
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"[t]he African race are essentially a degraded caste of inferior rank and
condition in society."'' "Marriages," the author continued, "are forbidden
between them and whites in some States, and when not absolutely con-
trary to law, they are revolting and regarded as an offence against public
decorum." 's The author then identified the ways that these legal distinc-
tions were etched into law. "By the revised Statutes of Illinois, published
in 1829, marriages between whites and negroes or mulattoes, are declared
void and persons so married are liable to be whipped, fined and impris-
oned"" In this description, the author emphasized the ways that the caste
system involved an entrenched hierarchy in which the social status of
groups was entrenched in legal categories.
The Anti-Slavery Record, first printed in Boston from 1835 to 1837,
published an article on "The Right of Northern Interference:' which
mounted an argument for ending slavery in the District of Columbia:
By the most express sanctions of the [C]onstitution, [C]ongress
has the power to abolish [slavery] at the seat of the national
government, and in [C]ongress a majority of forty are free
states. ... To bring the North up to this work, it is necessary
that the spirit of slavery in the North be met and conquered.
The prejudice of caste must be killed and buried. Colored men must
be allowed to take the place, freely, to which their manhood
entitles them.
8 7
In the vision of caste presented by this author, "the prejudice of caste" was
the defining characteristic of the social system that slavery had put into
place.8" It was this form of social subordination, the author implied, that
most deeply characterized caste. Furthermore, any efforts to end slavery
involved not only an end to the ownership of persons, but in fact, an end
to the forms of social stigma that the slave system imposed on human be-
ings, and to which it gave social significance.
In 1842, the Liberator published an article that described a meeting
of the British India Society in which a freedman gave a short speech on
the nature of race relations in the United States.The author reported,
Though he has never been a slave, yet, having suffered deeply
from the influence of that unhallowed spirit of caste, which
84. THE ABOLITIONIST: OR RECORD OF THE NEW ENGLAND ANTI-SLAVERY SOCI-
ETY, Nov. 1831, at 134.
85. Id.
86. THE ABOLITIONIST: OR RECORD OF THE NEW ENGLAND ANTI-SLAVERY SOCI-
ETY, Nov. 1833, at 164.
87. The Rightn of Northern bterference, Tl E ANTI-SLAVERY RECORD, Apr. 1837, at 6
(emphasis added). While it was originally published from 18135-37, the Anti-Slavery Record
was later revived in the 1860s.
88. Id.
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leads the (technically) white class to outlaw and insult his de-
scendants, in the remotest degree, of the African race, he can
speak, and does speak as one into whose soul the iron has en-
tered.s9
The notion of the "spirit of caste" referred to the formal categories im-
posed by a caste system, as well as the ideology that underlined it and the
forms of prejudice that it imposed on the lower castes. " These forms of
prejudice and discrimination against the lower castes created the ground
for the legal institutions and the perpetuation of the caste system over
generations. In 1856, the Liberator published an article entitled "Caste,"
which discussed the problem of racial prejudice in New England. "While
many of the free states have enacted shameful and brutal laws, under the
influence of the spirit of caste, it has been remarked that New England
was an exception in this matter. But this is not true."" Although "the Leg-
islature forced Boston to recognize our common school system as common,
and put an end to caste schools," there was nonetheless "in Boston a too
frequent exhibition of this mean prejudice.'"2
In an article published in 1847, the Liberator again took aim at the
emergence of caste distinctions as a consequence of slavery. "Free blacks
in New York," the author observed, "are not permitted to enjoy rights, as
native-born Americans, which are conceded to all foreigners who are
naturalized to the soil."',3 The Republican Party in New York, the author
wrote, was not "disposed to proclaim eternal oblivion to complexional
caste," and was willing to consider the serious harms that it imposed on
the country.9 4 Here, the harm imposed by the caste system seemed to have
more to do with the structure of status relations that it imposed, and less
to do with the specific cultural meanings associated with caste.
Authors of pamphlet literature relating to India often juxtaposed to
the mobility that characterized American society with the rigidity of the
Indian caste system. Descriptions of the Indian caste system in popular
magazines frequently emphasized that its particular form of hierarchy was
based on a hereditary aspect."' "[W]hat is peculiar to [the "Hindoos"] is
their division into castes.... None can ever quit his own caste, nor be ad-
mitted into another. The station of every individual is unalterably fixed;
89. American Slavery and the Prejudice Against Color, THE LIBERATOR (Boston), Jan. 7,
1842, at 3.
90. Id.
91. Caste, THE LIBERATOR (Boston), May 2, 1856, at 71.
92. Id.
93. THE LIBERATOR (Boston), Jan. 8, 1857, at 7.
94. Id.
95. Nathaniel Hawthorne, Vie Hindoo Castes, AM. MAG. OF USEFUL & ENTERTAIN-
ING KNOWLEDGE, at 64.
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his destiny is irrevocable; and his course in life is marked out, from which
he must never deviate." ,1
In 1845, a newsletter printed by the Society of Friends in Philadel-
phia published a short essay that described the basic character of the
Indian caste system and emphasized that it fixed one's social standing at
birth:
Castes are certain classes whose burdens and privileges are he-
reditary. The word is derived from the Portuguese casta, and
was originally applied by the conquerors of the East Indies, to
the Indian families, whose occupations, customs, privileges, and
duties are hereditary. This term has been sometimes applied to
the hereditary classes in Europe; and we speak of the spirit, or
the prerogatives and usurpation of a class, to express particu-
larly that unnatural constitution of society, which makes
distinction dependent on the accidents of birth and fortune....
Wealth, talents, education, and religion, or the want of them,
create the various classes and distinctions in this country.
Wealth ... [in the] United States, is constantly changing
hands.97
The important features of caste systems, then, were that they consigned
whole segments of society to low standing on the basis of their birth. This
conception of the social order was a stark contrast to the
impression of broader social mobility in the United States." Caste repre-
sented the antithesis of a system where individuals had the capacity to
increase their social standing through their own labor.
The concern with social hierarchy reflected in popular accounts of
other caste systems and in abolitionist rhetoric was connected to the most
basic ideological commitments of the Republican Party before the Civil
War. While there were important differences between the ideology of
Republicans and of the abolitionists, both movements were deeply con-
cerned about the problem of social division on account of birth. William
Forbarth has explained some of the important distinctions between the
two ideologies: "Free Labor ideology was still rooted in a regime of ar-
tisanal and petty entrepreneurial production," Forbath argues, while
"[a]bolitionism looked forward, as it were, to the emerging factory and
wage labor regime. Both, to be sure, were individualistic ideologies. But
the former's definition of freedom was bound up with traditional republi-
can notions of social equality and widespread distribution of productive
96. Id.
97. Castes, THE FRIEND. A RELIGIOUS & LITERARY J., June 7, 1845, at 294.
98. See id.
[VOL. 15:317
"The Prejudice of Caste"
property. ' Republican and "free labor" ideology were more critical of
the dominant modes of economic life, while abolitionism was more
"bourgeois" in its orientation, and was more inclined to protect the free
market principles in the labor market."')
As Eric Foner had observed, Republicans understood that "wage la-
bor was a temporary status," and that "laborers for hire do not exist as a
class.'" They believed in a form of economic mobility that permitted
members of the working classes to ascend in society based on merit.
Moreover, the Republican Party in the 1850s emphasized that "free labor
was degraded by slavery," and that the "invariable stigma" that attached to
labor would prevent northern laborers from settling in the territories. "-"
Republicans also used the caste metaphor to describe the status of
poor whites under the slave system. "They are depressed, poor, impover-
ished and illiterate, [and] degraded in caste," Jacob Collamer, a
Congressman from Vermont, argued in 1856, "because labor is disgrace-
ful."'1 3 These claims were, however, made in the context of a larger
critique of the stagnant social order of slave societies.The limitations in-
posed on social mobility by the slave system, the claim went, did not only
extended to blacks, but also to whites as well, whose place in the social
structure was fixed, and who were unable to improve their lot through
the hard work and initiative to which Republicans attached high value.
H. Charles Sumner and the Caste Metaphor
In the 1840s, the Republican politician Charles Sumner turned to
caste to describe the effects of slavery and of racial segregation in the
North. Sumner became involved in challenges to the Massachusetts public
schools in the late 1830s, and in early public statements regarding the sig-
nificance of race, he began to develop rhetoric that he would continue to
use throughout his political career, including in debates over the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. "4
99. William Forbath, The Amibiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gigilded
Age, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. 767, 783; See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 65 (1979) ("Southern
society, with its aristocracy based on slaveholding, seemed .. .the direct antithesis of the
egalitarian ideals of the North.").
100. Forbath, supra note 99.
101. See FONER, supra note 99, at xxi. On the persistence of this ideology in Recon-
struction, see ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 97-
127 (1980). See also DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL
REPUBLICANS, 1862-1872 (1967).
102. FONER, supra note 99, at 58.
103. CONG. GLOBE. 34th Cong. 3d Sess. App. at 53.
104. Sumner maintained close relationships with abolitionists through the 1830s and
40s, and even subscribed to the Liberator starting in 1835. "Unlike the Garrisonians who
denounced the Constitution as a proslavery document and desired no union with
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In December 1849, Sumner represented the plaintiff Sarah Roberts
before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the case of Roberts v.
City of Boston.'' Roberts was a Black child who had been excluded from
Boston public school. Roberts argued that she had been excluded from
the school in violation of the Massachusetts Constitution and the Massa-
chusetts education laws, which guaranteed education to children generally,
and not only to White children.'
In oral arguments before the Supreme Judicial Court, Sumner em-
barked on a lengthy discussion of the harms associated with caste. Sumner
argued that "[t]he separation of children in the Public Schools of Boston,
on account of color or race, is in the nature of Caste, and is a violation of
Equality."'' 7 Sumner then offered a definition of caste and clarified the
harm that it imposed on members of the lower social orders. To under-
stand the essential features of caste, it was necessary he said, to carefully
consider the example of caste in India:
[Caste] has become generally used to designate any hereditary
distinction, particularly of race. It is in India that it is most of-
ten applied; It is there that we must go in order to understand
its full force. A recent English writer on the subject, says, that it
is "not only a distinction by birth, but is founded on the doc-
trine of an essentially distinct origin of the different races,
which are thus unalterably separated." This is the very ground
of the Boston Schools Committee.'"
Sumner's description of caste rested solidly on a conception of caste as a
system of social organization that was based on a view that social groups
had different origins and should be forever separated.
Sumner then turned more directly to the Indian example. For him,
it was the example of caste in India that was the extreme case against
which American racial injustice should judged. It represented an example
of social harm that was so striking that it helped to clarify the harms im-
slaveholders, Sumner prided himself upon his 'strong attachment to the Constitution and
the Union.'" DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE
CIVIL WAR 133 (1981).
105. 59 Mass. 198 (1849). On the Roberts case see Morgan Kousser, The Supremacy of
Equal Rights': The Stri qle Against Racial Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the
Foundations of the Fourteenth Amendment, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 941 (1988) (discussing the
origins of the challenge to the segregation of Boston public schools); KULL, supra note 59,
at 40-52.
106. Roberts, 59 Mass. at 201-02.
107. ARGUMENT OF CHARLES SUMNER, ESQ. AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SEPARATE COLORED SCHOOLS, IN THE CASE OF SARAH C. ROBERTS VS. THE CITY OF Bos-
TON (Dec. 4, 1849), in ABOLITIONISTS IN THE NORTHERN COURTS: THE PAMPHLET
LITERATURE 493, 508 (Paul Finkelman ed. 1988) [hereinafter ARGUMENT OF CHARLES
SUMNER].
108. Id. (citation onitted).
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posed by the segregation of public schools in Boston because it repre-
sented a symbol of the perpetual and inhuman subjugation of social
groups. Sumner continued:
The Brahmins and the Sudras, in India, from generation to
generation, were kept apart. If a Sudra presumed to sit upon a
Brahmin's carpet, he was punished with banishment. It is with
a similar inhumanity, that the black child who goes to sit on
the same benches at school with the white child, is banished,
not from the country, but from the school. In both cases it is
the triumph of Caste....""
Sumner then embarked on several pages of description in which he
related missionary accounts of the caste system in nineteenth century In-
dia. "So strong is my desire that the Court should feel the enormity of
this system," he wrote, "that I shall here introduce an array of witnesses to
the unchristian character of Caste, as it appears in India, where it has been
most studied and discussed."'"
The image of caste in India was powerful because it figured the
problem of social subordination as part of a social hierarchy that had deep
roots in a society that was ancient and that would be extremely difficult
to dismantle. Sumner did not speak of what remedy would be required
here, but the image of the prohibition of a Sudra stepping on a Brahmin's
carpet suggests that he thought the problem of school segregation was
about more than discrimination."' Instead, it was about a set of social
practices, deeply held beliefs, and underlying social realities that rendered
the hierarchy real and permanent-keeping individuals locked in low so-
cial positions worked to demean their worth.
Sumner's comparison to India involved a repudiation of slavery as
un-Christian and barbaric. The historian Sarah Barringer Gordon has
traced the emergence of a set of arguments about polygamy and Mor-
monism in the nineteenth century that claimed that these practices were
inconsistent with Christian values, and should therefore be rejected."2
Sumner's characterization of slavery as "barbaric" was consistent with a
109. Id. at 509.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. SeC SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 55-58 (2002) ("In nine-
teenth-century American thought barbarism occupied a special, un-Christian place. It
constituted the inversion of progress, a Manichean counterweight to its successor, civiliza-
tion .... The identification of civilization with Christianity was deep and widespread; for
many theorists and politicians in the nineteenth century, civilization was founded on a
basic commitment to Christianity. The party that identified itself successfully as the pro-
tector of Christian civilization (and the vanquisher of barbarism) thus acquired significant
spiritual as well as political advantage.").
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style of constitutional argument that rested its claims broadly on the
Christian values that Americans shared. The claim of barbarism argued
that those who support such a practice were outside the Christian com-
munity to which all Americans were thought to belong. '" The assertion
that slavery was properly outside this community of belief, and associated
with a society thought to be uncivilized, was a powerful claim.
Sunmer compiled these descriptions of the Indian caste system from
a short book published by Joseph Roberts in 1849, entitled Caste, In Its
Religious And Civil Character, Opposed to Christianity.''4 Roberts introduced
the series of quotations from missionary accounts with a description of
the origins of the caste system and its basic features. "Caste is as impolitic
as it is unjust, it keeps up, more than any other thing, the want of cordial-
ity betwixt the rulers and the ruled; it feeds the evil, the vain prejudices of
people it cherishes nationalities so exclusive, so abhorrent, in the feelings
of the high caste man, that he deems all of Christian birth as the most
impure, most loathsome in his sight.""' Roberts also made a revealing
comparison of the caste system in India to the systems of hereditary dis-
tinctions in Europe that helped to clarify the harm imposed by caste.
"Civil distinction in Europe," Roberts argued, "depends not on birth
only: it depends chiefly on personal talents and personal industry.""" The
"idea of Caste" in India, he continued, was "not the same as ideas of civil
rank and distinction entertained by the nobles and Lords of England."",,
7
The descriptions of caste that Sunier culled from the pamphlet
were vivid. One of the quotations from Reverend W Bridgnall focused, in
particular, on the forms of "subjugation" imposed by the Indian caste sys-
tem:
I perfectly agree ... [that] in considering the institution of
Caste as the most formidable engine that was ever invented for
perpetuating the subjection of men; so that, as a friend of hu-
manity only, I should feel myself bound to protest against and
oppose it; but in particular as a Christian, I deem it my obvious
and imperative duty wholly to discountenance it, conceiving it
to be utterly repugnant to the whole spirit of Christianity.""
The caste system represented to Sumner the most stratified and oppressive
form of social hierarchy imaginable. It was also a form of hierarchy that
113. Id.
114. CASTE IN ITS RELIGIOUS AND CIVIL CHARACTER, OPPOSED TO CHRISTIANITY:
BEING A SERIES OF DOCUMENTS BY THE RIGIIT REVEREND BISHOPS HERBERT, WILSON,
CORRiE, AND SPENCER, AND BY EMINENT MINISTERS OF OTHER DENOMINATIONS (Joseph
Roberts ed., 1837).
115. Id. at 18.
116. Id. at 114.
117. Id.
118. Sumner, supra note 107, at 18.
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imposed a lasting stigma on members of the lower castes: "Caste makes a
man think that he is holier than another, and ... it makes him despise all
those who are lower than himself.""'"
As he concluded the section of his argument about the Indian caste
system, Sumner again emphasized the ways in which caste imposed dis-
abilities on the basis of one's membership in a certain group. "We abjure
all hereditary distinctions," he argued, "but here is an hereditary distinc-
tion, founded not on the merit of the ancestor, but on his color. We
abjure all privileges derived from birth; but here is a privilege which de-
pends solely on the accident, whether an ancestor is black or white.'"
The "hateful institution" of caste entrenched whole social groups in an
unjust and immovable hierarchy. The problem for Sumner was not just
that of discrimination, but of the "institution" of caste, and the social prac-
tices and attitudes surrounding it. Caste came to express a certain vision
of the harm of slavery that indicated that an end to discrimination would
not be enough, and that a wider range of interventions would be neces-
sary to finally wrest the social order from its grasp.
II.THE END OF CASTE:THE CASTE METAPHOR
AND THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
A. Th7e "Question of Caste" During Reconstruction
In the years after the Civil War, Sumner continued to evoke caste to
describe the harms perpetrated under slavery. Sumner's interest in caste
deepened, and it became consistent theme in his rhetoric with respect to
slavery. As he continued to use the metaphor during these years, Sumner
laid increasing emphasis on the aspects of caste that were related to its
stigmatic aspects that extended to groups. He was of course concerned
with the way that caste limits the opportunities of individuals, but in the
course of his advocacy for the Reconstruction Amendments, caste, for
him, powerfully depicted the impact of slavery and its aftermath.'2 ' The
way that caste framed the harm of slavery also posited a set of remedies
that could not be easily cabined and required an extensive and thorough-
going effort to break apart the crushing hierarchy that it imposed.
At the war's end, the metaphor of caste continued to resound in
abolitionist newsletters and the popular press. In 1865, for example, the
Anti-Slavery Reporter of Boston made the following observations about the
disenfranchisement of Blacks throughout the country: "[T]his disenfran-
chisement is perpetual hereditary, and insurmountable. It is more deeply
seated than Oriental caste. It clings to each man and his posterity forever,
119. Id. at 19.
120. Id. at 20.
121. Id.
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if there be a traceable thread of African descent.""2 "No achievements in
war or peace" the author continued, "no acquisitions of property, no edu-
cation, no mental power or culture, no merits, can overcome it.""
'
1
3
In 1869, Sumner published a lecture that he gave in Boston on the
"Question of Caste."'2' Caste, Sumner argued, was "nothing less than the
claim of hereditary power from color."' - The examples of real caste sys-
tems in India and elsewhere constituted a "living admonition to
mankind."' 2 , Caste, "he contended, "is essentially barbarous, and therefore
appears in barbarous ages, or in countries not yet relieved form the early
incubus. It flourished side by side with the sculpted bulls and cuneiform
characters of Assyria, and side by side with the pyramids and hieroglyphics
of Egypt.""127 Although they varied somewhat depending on the context,
in all of the countries where it had developed, caste systems had certain
qualities in common. "The system," he wrote, "had two distinct elements;
first, separation, with rank and privilege, or their opposite, with degrada-
tion and disability," and "secondly, descent from father to son; so that it
was perpetual separation from generation to generation" ' 52
Sumner drew the comparison between caste in the United States
and India in clearer terms than he had in his earlier writing. Sumner again
argued that caste in the United States, not unlike caste in India, was con-
stituted by a system of social subordination:
Change now the scene,-from ancient India, and the shadow
of unknown centuries, to our Republic, born of yesterday.
Here the Caste claiming hereditary rank and privilege is white;
the Caste doomed to hereditary degradation and disability is
black or yellow, and it is gravely asserted that this difference of
color marks difference of race, which justifies the discrimina-
tion. To save this enormity of claim from indignant
reprobation, it is insisted that the varieties of men do not pro-
ceed from a common stock,-that they are different in
origin,-that this difference is perpetuated in their respective
capacities, and the apology concludes with the practical as-
sumption, that the white man is a superior Caste not unlike
the Brahmin, while the black man is an inferior Caste not
122. Anti-Slavery Reporter, Aug. 1, 1865, at 191.
123. Id. at 191.
124. Charles Sumner, Lecture: The Question of Caste (1869).
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id. at 8.
127. Id. at 7.
128. Id.
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unlike the Sudra, sometimes even the Pariah; nor is the yellow
man exempted from this same insulting proscription."
2
The vision of caste that Sumner depicted in his short pamphlet un-
derscored that caste systems granted social standing through a system of
hereditary privilege, and that they impose "insult" and "indignant repro-
bation" on the lower castes in such a system. Caste was, in other words, a
profound social stigma, and it was in this precise sense that he saw a close
relationship between caste systems in other societies, and the structure of
American race relations.
Sumner described the caste metaphor at great length, because it
helped to clarify the nature of the harms imposed on members of the
lower castes in a social structure with a hierarchy of this kind. In debates
over the appropriate response to correct the harms exacted by slavery,
Sumner again turned to caste to describe hierarchy that it has imposed.
Caste was, in Sumner's eyes, the most vivid description of the rigid form
of social hierarchy that slavery imposed on Blacks.
B. Caste and the Ratification Debates
In debates in Congress over the proposals leading to the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, proponents of broader constitutional guaran-
tees of equality frequently returned to the metaphor of caste to
characterize the social hierarchies that they hoped to transform. Among
the advocates for the legislation, Senator Sumner was perhaps most in-
clined to advance arguments based on the caste metaphor. In these floor
speeches, however, Sumner now used "caste" not to refer to the set of so-
cial relationships that had existed under slavery but instead to describe the
new forms of subordination that he feared would emerge in its aftermath.
While Sumner did not often speak about the remedies that caste would
justify, the metaphor of caste invoked an image of a profoundly en-
trenched hierarchy that was so problematic-so "demonic"-that it
justified interventions in the social order.
"Others may be cool and indifferent," Sumner argued in 1869, "but
I have warred with Slavery too long not to be aroused when this old en-
emy shows its head under another alias."' 311 "It was once Slavery; it is now
Caste," he continued, "The old champions reappear, under other names,
and from other States, each crying out, that under the national Constitu-
tion, notwithstanding even its supplementary amendments, a State may, if
it pleases, deny political rights on account of race or color and thus estab-
lish the vilest institution, a Caste and an Oligarchy of the Skin."'' Sumner
129. ld. at 10-11.
130. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 902 (1869).
131. Id.
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later invoked the dangers of caste as he excoriated those who would in-
clude skin color among the "qualifications" and "regulations" that the
proposed amendment would allow states to adopt with respect to poten-
tial voters. The champions of such provisions, he argued, would create a
"monopoly of rights" that would limit opportunity for all.' -
Perhaps to some extent influenced by Sumner's rhetoric, many other
advocates for the proposed Amendment invoked the image of caste.
Senator Wilson, also from Massachusetts, said for instance, "Men who, in
the lights of this age in America that flash upon us from the battlefields
and patriot[s'] graves, continue to champion the lost cause of slavery, caste,
and human equality, are certain ... to meet the doom of men in other
lives who have disowned, scoffed and reviled the sublime creed of human
equality and brotherhood.'0'
3
Representative H.C. Van Wyck of New York returned to the caste
metaphor in debates over a bill he had introduced regarding the impris-
onment of American citizens overseas. Although the bill was not directly
relevant to the Fourteenth Amendment, it is revealing that Van Wyck felt
it appropriate to turn to the caste metaphor here as well. "The meanness
of caste in this country on account of color," he said, "is not more wicked
than the caste of nation, religion, or blood in Great Britain. Conservatives
talk of a white man's government, [but] in Great Britain only a certain
kind of white man's blood is entitled to consideration."'13 "Restrict free-
dom to color, caste, and blood," he continued, "and you are turning back
the hands on the dial of freedom.'
3 
,
In February, 1872, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Senate considered a bill that would have repealed Section III of the
Amendment, which imposed certain limitations on the Southern states
from holding political office. In the course of debates over this provision,
Sumner offered an example of the continuing stigma imposed by segrega-
tion:
Colored children, living near what is called the common
school, are driven from its doors, and compelled to walk a
considerable distance, often troublesome, and in certain condi-
tions of the weather difficult, to attend the separate school.
One of these children has suffered from this exposure, and I
have myself witnessed the emotion of the parent ... The
superadded pedestrianism and its attendant discomfort furnish
the measure of inequality in one of its forms, increased by the
weakness or ill health of the child. What must be the feeling of
132. Id.
133. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 3d Sess. 153 (1860).
134. CoNG. GLOBE, 90th 2d Sess. 469 (1968).
135. Id.
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a colored father or mother daily witnessing this sacrifice to the
demon of Caste?
3
"
This vision of caste was different the broad appeals to the "demon of
Caste" that Sumner had made in earlier speeches. Here, he aimed to give
caste a personal dimension, and to show vividly its impact on the lives of
children.The stigma of caste passed down from parent to child and could
not be eliminated by any means. Sumner underscored that it was not only
the black child who was born into such an oppressive system of status
relations who suffered, but also the parents as well, who watched their
children suffer at the hands of the injustices of the caste system that flour-
ished under slavery.
C. Caste and the Legacy of Reconstruction
After the Reconstruction Amendments had been enacted, the caste
metaphor continued to be invoked in disagreements about their plausible
reach. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, debates about the problems of
segregation continued to frequently turn on the caste metaphor. The im-
ages that these commentators invoked drew from the meanings of caste
that had emerged in abolitionist circles and occupied a prominent place
during the ratification debates.
The New York Independent published a short essay in 1881 that of-
fered harsh criticism of a law passed in Texas that prohibited intermarriage
between Whites and Blacks.'3 "Such legislation has its basis in race caste,"
the author contended, "and is intended to mark the black race as an infe-
rior and degraded race of beings unfit to intermarry with the true
superior white race.",131 In 1882, John Miller McKee, writing in Cumber-
land Presbyterian Quarterly, advocated the passage of laws "fixing a standard
of education, of intelligence, of character, a standard of manly competence
for the high and sacred trust of voting.' 3 In support of these new voting
regulations, McKee argued that "It would not be a rule of race nor of
caste; and it would be his own fault if with schools and trades open to
qualify his manhood, he should long fail to take his place as a voter." In-
deed, "the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment could not have been better
pleased.""4
Justice Harlan's contributions to the efforts to dismantle segregation
were recalled in the following way in an editorial published in Southern
Republican newspaper in 1883:
136. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1872).
137. THE INDEPENDENT, March 17, 1881, at 33.
138. !d.
139. John Miller McKee, 4/hiat Will the Negro Do With Himself CUMB. QTL'Y REV.,
Apr. 1882, at 129, 137.
140. Id. at 138.
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It will be remembered that Judge Harlan was not rocked in the
cradle prepared by the genius of universal emancipation ... but
from boyhood to ripe and useful manhood, having been born
in the midst of slavery, he was surrounded in his native State by
all the influences of the demon of caste. Notwithstanding, he
rises above all these, clothed in the judicial garments of the
Supreme Court. Solitary and alone, he offers a classic ... re-
141buke to the Court....
The writer of this obituary turned to caste to describe the structure of
status relations in the South, and in doing so, recalled Sumner's phrase
"demon of caste" that had redounded through the debates over the ratifi-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thaddeus B. Wakeman, a New York lawyer, wrote an essay in 1891
in the Open Court, a literary and political magazine, which directly refer-
enced Sumner's usages of caste the caste metaphor to describe racial
subordination.-4 2 Wakemen argued,
[T]he Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the Constitution, which Senator Sumner supposed would
protect the freedmen from caste, and which were to stand as
his proudest monuments, have by their failure tended to justify
and establish the very caste, they were passed to prevent ... [a]
land of caste is a land of bondage, ever deepening from genera-
tion to generation.
For Wakeman, writing from the perspective of the 1890s, it was caste that
was the most central commitment of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was
Sumner's invocation of this "caste and its evils" that depicted the social
hierarchies that the Reconstruction Amendments aimed to dismantle.
Wakeman argued that the Fourteenth Amendment took aim at caste, and
that it sought to end it. This formulation suggests that, under such a con-
ception, these status hierarchies were conceptualized by our equality law,
and perhaps even that it sought to intervene in them and reconstruct
them. For Wakeman, the Constitution was not in any sense blind to caste,
but instead that it took caste properly in its sights and aimed to "prevent"
its entrenchment over time.
The image of caste persisted into the 1890s and continued to be
closely associated with the problem of social hierarchy. In some of these
discussions, the eradication of caste was understood to be the principle at
the heart of the Equal Protection Clause. These invocations of caste sug-
141. KENTUCKY REPUBLICAN, 1883, at 45.
142. T.B. Wakenian, Planetary Statesmanship and the Negqro, OPEN COURT, Aug. 1890,
at 2433.
143. Id. at 2434.
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gested that the Constitution set its sights on these status hierarchies and
sought to dismantle them. While commentators did not extensively write
about the remedies that would be justified by caste, the orientation that
they suggested between the Constitution and these status hierarchies
strongly suggested that caste justified such interventions. Caste was so in-
vidious, and so alive, that the remedy that would be necessary to end it
would be a dramatic and costly one. The metaphor of caste continued to
frame these debates about the social status of African Americans and the
Constitution in the years after the Reconstruction. It remained a feature
of debates about the meaning and possibilities of our equality law.
III. R-E-READING JUSTICE HARLAN
In the litigation that culminated in Plessy, the lawyers who mobi-
lized to challenge racial segregation in Louisiana drew on the arguments
about caste that had developed over debates about slavery and during Re-
construction. These arguments turned to these debates not primarily for
the image of colorblindness, but based instead on a series of arguments
about caste that had come to have a particular meaning in debates about
the values embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment. Caste re-emerged
over the course of this litigation in ways that foreground the problem of
status harm.Justice Harlan's invocation of the metaphor should be under-
stood as addressing the problem of social subordination presented in the
briefs and over the course of the litigation. This Part examines Justice
Harlan's dissent in view of the tradition of arguments about social subor-
dination and the significance of the caste metaphor in these debates.
A. The Caste Metaphor and the Plessy Litigation
For the lawyers who argued Plessy, the metaphor of caste became a
powerful image for describing the social practices they sought to chal-
lenge. The claims that Homer Plessy's lawyers made during the litigation
were articulated in a language of caste that drew on a set of meanings that
had developed over many years, and that had become a symbol in contro-
versies over the meaning of equal protection.
Rebecca Scott has argued that the origins of the Plessy litigation can
be found in Louisiana in the 1890s, and that it was the idea of "public
rights" that contributed the basic structure of their arguments about
segregation. "For Plessy's fellow activists in New Orleans, 'public rights
and privileges' were essential to the substance and symbolism of the equal
dignity of citizens in the public sphere," she argues, "and a claim of equal
standing in public directly challenged the effort to impose white
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supremacy..."" Scott suggests that the pattern of legal challenges and
precedent for articulating claims of status harm under the Louisiana
Constitution's "public rights" provisions-with deep roots in the French
Enlightenment-provided the relevant intellectual background that gave
the claims about the harm of segregation their content.'14 Although she
does not develop this claim substantially, Scott urges that it is this
background of ideas about public rights that should inform our readings
of caste in Justice Harlan's opinion.'4 " Scott, however, does not aim to
show how this should alter our interpretation of the opinion or the ways
that it was related to a longer tradition of arguments about caste.141
A different reading of the briefs filed in Plessy, however, suggests that
they not only drew on the "public rights" tradition from Louisiana's con-
stitution and culture, but also the precedent of arguing about the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment in terms of caste. The authors of these
briefs understood that they were writing for a national audience, and as
this Article has suggested, there was a richly articulated tradition of
arguments from caste that could inform its articulations of the distinct
harms of segregation on railroad cars in Louisiana.""
Plessy's brief filed in the Supreme Court, drew on caste imagery to
describe the nature of the slave system and the social structure that it im-
posed. "Slavery," the brief argued, "was a caste, a legal condition of
subjection to a dominant class, a bondage quite separable from the inci-
dent of ownership." "It was the subjection to the control of the dominant
race individually and collectively, which was the especially distinctive feature
of slavery as contra-distinguished from involuntary servitude."", The brief
returned to the caste metaphor in its final paragraphs:
Suppose a member of this court, nay, suppose every member of
it, by some mysterious dispensation of providence should wake
to-morrow with a black skin and curly hair-the two obvious
and controlling indications of race and-in traveling through
that portion of the country where the "Jim Crow Car"
abounds, should be ordered into it by the conductor. It is easy
to imagine what would be the result, the indignation, the pro-
tests, the assertion of pure Caucasian ancestry...
144. See Scott, supra note 10, at 781.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 803. ("And although Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy did not use
the words 'public rights,' his claim that the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens' and thus '[tlhere is no caste here' echoes the plaintiff's brief in its
underlying logic.").
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), 1893 WL
10660, at * 32-33 (emphasis added).
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But the conductor, the autocrat of Caste, armed with the
power of the state conferred by this statute, will neither listen
to denial or protest. "In you go or out you go," is his ultima-
turn .... You would feel then and know that such assortment of
citizens on the line of race was a discrimination intended to
humiliate and degrade the former subject and dependent
class-an attempt to perpetuate the caste distinctions on which
slavery rested.' "
Caste now emerged in a narrative that aimed to evoke the nature of the
status-harms that segregation imposed in the aftermath of slavery. It was
"subjection" and the "humilat[ion] and the "degreda[tion]" of caste that
was its most fundamental aspect.
The vision of caste presented to the Court in the plaintiff's brief was
not one that emphasized the classification of individuals. Instead, the im-
age of the Justices of the Supreme Court becoming Black and subjected
to segregation was intended to convey an impression of the status harms
associated with segregation. It was in this context that the problem of
caste most clearly presented itself. It was here, in view of a social hierarchy
turned upside down, that the metaphor of caste was offered to the Court
as a central commitment of the Equal Protection Clause.
In this way, the lawyers for Homer Plessy adopted the metaphor of
caste that had originated with abolitionism and emerged again in debates
over ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The arguments about
subordination, and the rhetoric of "subjugation" persisted, and continued
to shape ways that the harms of slavery could be comprehended from the
perspective of its aftermath. The briefs drew on a particular strategy for
articulating status harm in existing practices of constitutional politics, and
it was in view of this tradition, and its invocation in the briefs, that Harlan
used the term.
B. The Caste Metaphor and Harlan s Dissent
A more accurate reading of the caste metaphor in Justice Harlan's
opinion strongly argues against a view of the opinion that focuses exclu-
sively on the parts of the opinion-most notably the image of
colorblindness-that invoke anticlassification values. By taking account of
the caste metaphor, the rest of the opinion can be understood to be con-
cerned, in other respects, with the problem of social hierarchy and the
subordination of social groups. A proper reading of the opinion is one
that understands the significance of status-based harm for Justice Harlan's
150. Id. at 35.
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reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, and substantially alters interpreta-
tions of the paragraph where colorblindness appears."'
Justice Harlan invokes the caste metaphor in the following para-
graph of the opinion, which begins with an assertion of the problem of
social hierarchy:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education,
in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds
fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of
the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country
no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here.'"2
The first part of this paragraph is not concerned with the problem of dis-
crimination, but instead begins with a description of the substantial
inequalities separating whites from blacks. The image of caste at the end
of this paragraph adds substantial emphasis to the view of social inequality
that precedes it.' 3 The colorblindness imagery is thus embedded in a
paragraph that begins with a discussion about social hierarchy and the
subordination of groups.
The rest of the opinion is rife with discussion of status-based harm.
In a powerful passage, Justice Harlan described the harms caused by seg-
regation in terms of subordination:
May it not now be reasonably expected that astute men of the
dominant race ... that its supremacy will be imperiled, by
contact on public highways with black people, will endeavor
to procure statutes requiring white and black jurors to be sepa-
rated in the jury box by a 'partition; and that, upon retiring
from the court room to consult as to their verdict, such parti-
tion, if it be a movable one, shall be taken to their consultation
room, and set up in such way as to prevent black jurors from
coming too close to their brother jurors of the white race.154
151. At the same time, Justice Harlan's views on race were of course extremely
complex and at times conflicted. See TINSLEY E. YARBOROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE
FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 160 (1995) (noting that passages in the dissent "prompt speculation
whether the justice who denounced segregation in transportation, voting, places of public
amusement, and the jury box might have a different stance in more sensitive areas of hu-
man interaction").
152. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 562.
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The images of separation that Justice Harlan describes in the jury-box
underscore the humiliation felt by Blacks who must face down the psy-
chical separation from Whites. Segregation on public highways, Harlan
concluded, was a "badge of servitude," that is "wholly inconsistent with
the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the
[C]onstitution."'" Further, the prohibition of physical contact in these
passages recalled the abolitionists' and Suner's concern with that aspect
i56,
of the caste system that insisted on spatial separation .
Harlan's emphasis on the "badge of servitude" imposed by slavery
and the subordinating effects of slavery are given a renewed emphasis by
the inclusion of the "caste" metaphor in the dissent. The paragraph in
which Harlan discusses colorblindness and the problems inherent in dis-
crimination must be understood in view of Harlan's' fundamental
concern with social hierarchy. The dissent is of course to some extent
concerned with the problems of anticlassification, but the discussion of
colorblindness is actually a much more limited section of the dissent, and
in fact emerges in a paragraph that begins by underscoring the problem
of social hierarchy
As late as 1912, in a law review article that summarized Harlan's
great dissents, there was no mention of the colorblind language.' In fact,
the article's reading of the dissent understood its ground to be subordina-
tion and not classification.'"" The article emphasized the impact of
segregation on African Americans, and did not conclude that Harlan's dis-
sent should be read as a prohibition of classification."9Y
IV. A PROPHETIC VOICE IN A DIFFERENT KEY:
THE R-ETURN TO CASTE IN BROWN?
Proponents of anticlassification have urged that the commitment to
colorblindness in Harlan's dissent should be understood as having been
redeemed by Brotvn."" Such arguments for Plessy's significance rest on an
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
157. See H.B. Brown, The Dissenting Opinions of Mr Justice Harlan, 46 AM. L. REV.
321 (1912).
158. Id. at 337-38.
159. Id. ("Mr. Justice Harlan dissented [in Plessyl upon the ground that the legisla-
tion was inconsistent, not only with the equality of rights which pertain to citizenship,
but with the personal liberty enjoyed by everyone within the United States. He thought
the arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis of race, while they are on the public high-
way, was a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and equality
before the law established by the Constitution, and could not be justified upon any legal
grounds. He assumed what is probably the fact, that the statute had its origin in the pur-
pose, not so much to exclude uhite persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude
colored people from coaches occupied or assmrned to white persons.") (emphasis added).
160. See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
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idea of a constitutional canon, and that our readings of Plessy are closely
linked to our readings of Brown."" In the narrative offered by proponents
of colorblindness, the relationship between the two decisions is best un-
derstood as one in which Brown redeemed Harlan's dissent in Plessy by
appropriating the colorblind ideal." '2
A study of the period before Brown from the vantage point of caste
language, however, suggests a different relationship between the two opin-
ions in the equal protection tradition. In the period leading up to and
immediately following Brown, opponents of segregation in the South fre-
quently returned to the metaphor of caste to describe the social
hierarchies that they aimed to dismantle. The caste language that emerged
in debates over the meaning of segregation figured the problem of segre-
gation as one that involved the subordination of groups. While it was
informed, in many cases, by new social science research, opponents of
segregation continued to recall early debates over slavery and Harlan's
reference to caste.
Revisiting discussion of caste and of Harlan's dissent in the period
before Brown and in its immediate wake suggests that colorblind
arguments misunderstand the significance of Harlan's opinion from the
perspective of Brown, by suggesting that Brown canonized its commitment
to anticlassification.'13 This Part does not aim to give a comprehensive re-
reading of Brown, but instead to show a common lineage in the tradition
of caste reasoning in the nineteenth century, which connects Harlan's dis-
sent to Brown in ways that challenge the conventional reading of Harlan's
dissent as a canonical text.
A. Caste and Debate over Segregation, 1935-1954
Legal scholars have powerfully challenged the view that in the pe-
riod immediately following Brown, the decision was best understood as
resting on an anticlassification principle. Reva Siegel has reconstructed the
161. Primus, supra note 33, at 257 ("By rejecting Plessy, Brown stripped Plessy of its
authoritative status. But it also did more than that. Because Brown is a canonical decision,
it transformed Plessy into an anti-canonical text: it made Plessy into a [negative] reference
point rather than a mere irrelevance. In so doing, it reversed the yoked pair of Plessy's
majority and dissent, made the authoritative anti-authoritative and set the stage for
Harlan's opinion to become canonical.").
162. See id.
163. In situating Brown with respect to Plessy, I recognize that there are significant
problems with this chronology as a historical matter. See Kenneth W. Mack, Retlinkingk
Civil Riglts Era Lauyer and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 155 YALE L.J. 256, 263 (2005)
(arguing that the Plessy to Brown narrative has emphasized a view of legal liberalism that
does not give adequate attention to the broader range of concerns that motivated African
American lawyers in the early Civil Rights Era); Susan D. Carle, Debunking the Myth of
Civil Riqhts Liberalism: Visions of Racial Justice in the 7Tought of T. Thomas Fortune, 1880-
1890, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1479 (2009).
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history of the debate over segregation in the years before Brown to illus-
trate the ways that antisubordination and anticlassification values were
transformed during the aftermath of the decision."' 4 "The anticlassification
principle with which we are familiar today," Siegel argues, "did not organ-
ize early debates over Brown. In fact, in the decision's immediate wake,
debate often focused on questions of group harm, and many justifications
offered for Brown sounded like a defense of the opinion might today:""'
In the accounts offered by these scholars, the debate surrounding the
Brown decision involved articulations of both anticlassification and anti-
subordination values.""'
This scholarship has identified substantial difficulties with arguments
that posit Brown as embracing Harlan's description of colorblindness. I do
not mean to repeat these efforts, and instead approach these materials
with the smaller goal of demonstrating the significance of reasoning about
caste in these debates.The resurgence of caste in Brown suggests a different
connection between Justice Harlan's dissent and Brown decision in the
equal protection tradition. Even if these arguments did not directly refer-
ence the metaphor of caste in Justice Harlan's dissent, they drew on a
tradition of argumentation about status hierarchy through the caste meta-
phor that extended to the nineteenth century. The relationship between
the dissent and Brown should be reevaluated in terms of this common lan-
guage about status relations.
In the debates over segregation before Brown, the caste metaphor
again gained salience as a description of the status harms associated with
racial hierarchy. Between the late 1930s and the early 1940s, sociologists
and lawyers began to describe the problems of these social harms in terms
of the caste metaphor. The sociologist W Lloyd Warner first revived the
caste metaphor with his 1936 article, "American Caste and Class," which
attempted to describe the plight of African Americans from the perspec-
tive of caste systems. "'v This literature was distinctly focused on the
problem of social subordination as the more troubling consequence of
segregation.Warner defined caste in the following way:
Caste ... describes a theoretical arrangement of the people of
the given group in an order in which the privileges, duties,
164. Siegel, supra note 5; see also Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind
Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 207 (2008) ("During the Brown litigation, lawyers
advocating a blanket prohibition of racial classifications never put forth these arguments in
isolation from other, more context-based, color-conscious arguments relating to the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. At a time when the problem of 'benign' racial
preferences and affirmative action was rarely even considered, civil rights advocates easily
moved back and forth between making anticlassification arguments and clains based on
what has come to be known as 'antisubordination' principles'.
165. Siegel, supra note 5, at 1474.
166. Id.
167. W. Lloyd Warner, American Caste and Class, 42 AM. J. Soc. 234 (1936).
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obligations, [and] opportunities ... are unequally distributed
between the groups which are considered to be higher and
lower ... A caste organization ... can be further defined as one
where marriage between two or more groups is not sanc-
tioned and where there is no opportunity for members of the
lower groups to rise into the upper groups or of the members
of the upper to fall into the lower ones."1'
Warner's article helped to encourage a vast literature in the years be-
fore Brown that explored the problem of race relations through the lens of
caste."' An especially influential contribution in this vein was Gunnar
Myrdal's book on race relations in the United States, An American
Dilemma, which was published in 1944.' 7 Myrdal used the term "caste" to
describe the nature of status relations in the South. "The caste system
governing the relations between whites and Negroes:' Myrdal wrote, "in
the South not only had its birth in rural areas but also its integration into
the social structure of a relatively static rural society."'"' The influence of
these sociological accounts of caste could even be felt in a report issued
by President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights in 1947, which used
the caste metaphor to describe the problem of segregated institutions.1
2
While they wrote from the perspective of academic sociology and
related disciplines, a number of these scholars continued to reference the
earlier, nineteenth century lineage of arguments about social subordina-
tion in terms of the caste metaphor. Oliver Cox, for example, writing in
168. Id. at 234.
169. For Warner's own contributions, see, e.g., W. Lloyd Warner & Allison Davis, A
Comparative Study of American Caste, in RACE RELATIONS AND THE RACE PROBLEM 219
(Edgar T. Thompson ed., 1939); W. LLOYD WARNER, BUFORD H. JUNKER & WALTER A.
ADAMS, COLOR AND HUMAN NATURE (1941). For other literature on caste, seeJOHN DOL-
LARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN (1937); BUELL G. GALLAGHER, AMERICAN
CASTE AND THE NEGRO COLLEGE (Gordian Press 1966) (1938); DONALD YOUNG, RE-
SEARCH MEMORANDUM ON MINORITY PEOPLES IN THE DEPRESSION (Arno Press 1972)
(1937).
170. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
171. Id. at xxxviii. Myrdal's book is rife with the caste metaphor. See id. at 57 (dis-
cussing the "White Man's Theory of Color Caste"); id. at 88 ("The caste system has
inherited the defense ideology of slavery."); id. at 145 ("The belief in the innate inferior-
ity of the Negro . . . is strategic in its justification of color caste."); id. at 222 ("[l]n certain
respects, the surviving caste system shows even more resistance to change than did slav-
ery.").
172. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To Secure These Rights 82 (1947), avail-
able at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/civilrights/srights2.htm#79 ("[W]e believe that not
even the most mathematically precise equality of segregated institutions can properly be
considered equality under the law. No argumient or rationalization can alter this basic fact:
a law which forbids a group of American citizens to associate with other citizens in the
ordinary course of daily living creates inequality by imposing a caste status on the minor-
ity group.").
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1942, summarized the contributions of scholars to the analysis of caste in
American society, "We do not know who made the first analogy between
race relations and the caste system of India," Cox wrote, "but it is certain
that the idea was quite popular during the middle of the last century.13
One of the most detailed and extended discussions of this hypothesis is
that of the Hon. Charles Sumner published in 1869.'07 The discussions of
caste that emerged in sociological writing in the years before Brown ech-
oed the nineteenth century concern with social hierarchy. Even when
these writers did not directly reference these debates, it was clear that they
were aware of them, and understood their arguments to involve similar
claims about the moral harms of the subordination of social groups.
Lawyers also frequently invoked the caste metaphor in the emerging
debates over the legality of segregation. In a Article published in the Co-
lumbia Law Review in 1949, the student author argued that "[w]hatever
their express purpose may be, segregation laws seem really to represent an
effort to impose on the racial minority the status of an inferior caste."' 7 A
student writing in the Michigan Law Review in 1951 similarly analogized
caste to segregation, and cited to Myrdal, as well as to the portion of
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy that invoked the caste metaphor. 17
B. Caste and the Antisubordination Interpretation of Brown
The briefs filed in Brown returned to the caste metaphor in powerful
ways as part of the arguments they made against segregation. The brief for
the Appellants, which was drafted by Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood
Robinson, and other leading lawyers of the civil rights movement, in-
voked caste to describe the fundamental aspiration of the Equal
Protection Clause.' 7  Plessy had in their view, "maint[ained] of a racial
173. Oliver C. Cox, The Modern Caste School of Race Relations, 21 Soc. FORCES 218,
225 (1942).
174. Id. (citing CHARLES SUMNER, THE QUESTION OF CASTE (1869))
175. Note, Is Racial Segreation Consistent With Equal Protection of the Laws? Plessy v.
Ferguson Reexamined, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 637 (1949).
176. Joseph S. Ransmeier, Note, The Fourteenth Aniendnment and the Separate but Equal
Doctrine, 50 MICH. L. REV. 203, 248 (1951) ("Yet a third possible purpose of separate
education might be an intention on the part of the dominant group to discriminate, to
impose upon the separated group the badge of an inerior caste ....") (emphasis added); id.
at 249 n.2 2 5 (citing Justice Harlan's dissent as support for its invocation of caste); see also
Monroe Berger, The Supreme Court and Group Discrimination Since 1937, 49 COLUM. L.
REV. 201, 204 (1949) ("The Supreme Court's role in the American caste order may be
clarified by first briefly summarizing and illustrating the role in this respect of law in gen-
eral. The federal and state governments have swung between two legal poles, one
favorable and one unfavorable to the Negro.").
177. Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on Re-
argument, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1953), 1953 WL 48699.
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caste system in the United States."'' 7 At the start of the brief, the lawyers
argued:
Candor requires recognition that the plain purpose and effect
of segregated education is to perpetuate an inferior status for
Negroes which is America's sorry heritage from slavery. But
the primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
deprive the states of all power to perpetuate such a caste sys-
179
ten.
By carefully reviewing the ratification debates, the brief emphasized
the centrality of caste to the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
brief stated,"It was this inferior caste position which the Radical Repub-
licans in Congress were determined to destroy. They were equally
determined that by federal statutory or constitutional means, or both,
Congress would not only invalidate the existing Black Codes but would
proscribe any and all future attempts to enforce governmentally-imposed
caste distinctions."""' These arguments in the brief drew from the nine-
teenth century background of caste reasoning. While the more recent
sociological arguments were clearly relevant in some sense as well, it was
the nineteenth century lineage of arguments about caste, and especially
the arguments that emerged in debates over slavery and during the ratifi-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment that were most relevant.
Parties who submitted amicus curiae briefs in Brown also drew sig-
nificantly on caste reasoning in the arguments that they made in
opposition to segregation.'"' These arguments tended to draw less direct
support from the nineteenth century materials on caste, but nonetheless
discussed caste at length for its rhetorical power as a description of the
social harms associated with segregation.
Although the Court did not specifically invoke caste in its decision,
at least one member of the Court suggested that an anticaste principle
should constitute the basic commitment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"[Tihe [Reconstruction] Amendments have as their basic purpose protec-
178. Id. at *62.
179. Id. at *17 (emphasis in original).
180. Id. at *80; see id. at *119 ("Senator Howard, among others, asserted categori-
cally that the effect of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be to sweep away entirely all caste legislation in the United States.").
181. Brief for American Jewish Congress as Anicus Curiae, Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1952), 1952 WL 82044, at *12 ("Those who insist upon the caste
system in our society freely and unstintingly agree to the ritual of equal physical facilities
so long as somehow there is also an accompanying communication that the Negro is
inferior and is to remain so."); Brief for American Veterans Committee, Inc., Anicus
Curiae, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 1952 WL 82042, at *6 ("The
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted precisely to abrogate the disadvantages resulting
from an inferior caste status imposed by law.").
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tion of the negro against discrimination," he wrote in his Conference
notes, and "the abolition of such castes.''s Although Justice Black eventu-
ally became a stronger proponent of anticlassification reasoning in later
decisions, in the discussions in the Court over Brotvn, he was impressed by
the argument that caste had a central place in the early debates over the
Amendment.'8
In the aftermath of the Brown decision, commentators frequently
turned to the idea of the elimination of "caste" to describe its basic aspira-
tion. Phineas lndritz of the American Veterans Committee argued in
1954, in the Journal of Negro Education, that in Brown the "Court thus ex-
cised the legal foundation of the massive color-caste structure of racial
segregation in America."'' 14 "The roots of the color-caste system," Indritz
suggested, "originated in forced manual labor and grew to fruition as the
system of slavery" became gradually entrenched. Furthermore, the Black
Codes under Jim Crow were "designed to keep the negro in the inferior
caste system into which slavery had submerged him." 5 Although lndritz
did not specifically cite the caste language in Harlan's opinion, he did
conclude that "Justice Harlan's eloquent dissent was prophetic," because
"history has shown that the much of the blame for the . . .'problem of the
color line' rests on the coddling and cynical acquiescence of the Plessy
d e c is io n . . . . " '1 "
Writing in 1958, the political scientist Guy Johnson explored the
origins of "race-caste" system in the South as part of an effort to put re-
cent efforts at desegregation in context."" Johnson wrote, "In assessing the
evil results of compulsory segregation, it is admittedly hard to separate the
consequences of Jim Crow as such from the consequences of the larger
system of caste relations of which Jim Crow is but one part.""" In John-
son's view, perhaps the most damaging aspect of caste was the impact it
had on the psychology of Blacks.Johnson observed:
182. Schmidt, supra note 164, at 220 (citing Transcription of William 0. Douglas,
Conference Notes-First Brown Conference (Dec. 13, 1952), William 0. Douglas Pa-
pers, Box 1150, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. (on file
with author); Transcription of Tom Clark, Conference Notes-First Brown Conference
(n.d.), Toni Clark Papers, Box 27A, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas (on file
with author)).
183. Id.
184. Phineas Indritz, The Meaning of the School Decisions: The Breakthrough on the Front
of Racial Segregation, 23 J. NEGRo EDuc. 355, 355 (1954). lndritz had also filed a brief in
Brown on behalf of the American Veterans Committee that emphasized similar caste-based
arguments. See Brief for American Veterans Committee, Inc. Amicus Curiae, supra note
181.
185. Indritz, supra note 184, at 355.
186. Id. at 356.
187. See Guy B. Johnson, Freedom, Equality, Segregation, 20 PEV. POL. 147 (1958).
188. Id. at 156.
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The system of caste and segregation works so thoroughly and
automatically that it has tended to produce in the Negro
masses a type of character which is painfully like the white
man's stereotyped image of the Negro. It is a sorry spectacle
indeed when the white man points to the results of this vi-
cious circle as proof of the necessity for its continuation, but
this is precisely what the Negro has been up against .... [I]t
will be several generations before the Negro can overcome this
damage to his morale and his motivation.'
For Johnson, the distinct harm of segregation was that it subordinated
Blacks in ways that impressed on them a feeling of inferiority that made
rendered it very difficult to rise in the social structure.""
In the period after Brown, there were few judicial citations to
Harlan's dissent, and it was not a prominent feature of the controversies
about desegregation."' Nonetheless, many lawyers in this period contin-
ued to understand its central principle as directed at caste, and did not
generally understand the metaphor of colorblindness to constitute its cen-
tral ground. Reflecting on the importance of Harlan's opinion, Alfred H.
Kelly wrote in 1956 that "the former slaveholder and opponent of aboli-
tion [spoke] to the revolutionary intent of the [Fourteenth]
[A]mendment: its purpose had been, he thought, to destroy all caste and
racial class legislation in the United States." "" Kelly examined the back-
ground to the Fourteenth Amendment in the nineteenth century, and
emphasized the emergence of arguments about caste in the years before
the Civil War and during Reconstruction. '3 Kelly also discussed Sumner's
arguments about caste in the Roberts case as evidence of early discussion
about the problem of desegregation.""
Kelly concluded that, "In our own time, another Radical evolution
of social political ideology has undoubtedly brought the force and intent
of the amendment with respect to race and caste far nearer to the old an-
tislavery ideal out of which the language of the first section grew."' , It
189. Id. at 157.
190. Id.
191. See Krishnakuniar, supra note 7, at 800.
192. Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Ques-
tion, 54 Micn. L. evEv. 1049, 1049 (1956).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1056 ("Sumner's argument in the resulting Roberts case stands even today
as the classic argument for the incompatibility of "equal protection of the laws" and state-
sanctioned caste institutions. Asserting that his animating principle of equal protection was
derived properly from the language of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 declaring
that 'all men are born free and equal,' he asserted that segregated schools violated equal
protection and the state constitution by imposing inconvenience upon Negro children
and 'by establishing a system of Caste [as] odious as that of the Hindoos.' ").
195. Id. at 1086.
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was aspiration to end caste, and not the image of colorblindness, that for
Kelly, was the principle at the heart of Harlan's decision, and that marked
its significance for contemporary debates over desegregation.
In the controversies over Brown, when opponents of segregation in-
voked caste, they drew upon a long history of reasoning about social
hierarchy with deep roots in the nineteenth century. It was in this lineage
that Justice Harlan's dissent also found support. During the Brown era, the
relationship between anticlassification values and antisubordination values
was more fluid; the fact that the anticlassification principle emerged in
certain of these debates did not preclude talk of status harm."" Indeed, it
was not until disagreements over Brown had subsided that anticlassification
was understood to be its central comnitment.' 7 The tradition of caste
reasoning and the contributions of sociologists in the "caste school"",
offered lawyers a way of talking about the problems of social hierarchy
and social subordination entailed in segregation.
Caste was a powerful note in the antisubordination claims that
emerged in debates over Brown. By examining the persistence of the caste
metaphor during the debates over segregation, the influence of the caste
metaphor linked the antisubordination reasoning in Harlan's dissent to the
claims made by civil rights lawyers, sociologists, and in public discussions
about the harms associated with segregation. Even to the extent that
Harlan's dissent was not explicitly discussed, the caste reasoning in the
dissent draws from the same lineage of status reasoning as the lawyers in
Brown. The anticlassification view that it was in their shared commitment
to a colorblindness rationale that Harlan's dissent and Brown most closely
overlap is therefore profoundly misleading.
196. See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1474-75 ("But what revisiting this debate makes
clearest is that, in this early period, talk of classification and subordination did not have
the same significance it now has. The understanding that anticlassification and antisubor-
dination are competing principles that vindicate different complexes of values and justify
different doctrinal regimes is an outgrowth of decades of struggle over Brotm, and is not
itself a ground of the decision or of the earliest debates it prompted.").
197. Id. at 1478 (arguing that anticlassification has the "power to answer and to defer
questions about the Constitution's meaning, and at times have enabled it to vindicate
antisubordination commitments in ways that 'hotter' talk of group harm cannot."); see id.
at 1500-1546 (elaborating these arguments by turning to debates over Brou'lz's rationale
from 1960-70).
198. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 173.
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CONCLUSION
R eadings ofJustice Harlan's dissent seem to rest on little more than
faith. It is a puzzling fact about the equal protection tradition that a dis-
senting opinion in a case, now overturned, has come to stand at the
foundation of so much law. Proponents of the anticlassification position
turn to history not because of what it reveals about the intentions of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment or its meaning in the nineteenth
century, or because of its status as binding law. Instead, they appeal to our
elemental, collective self-understanding about the history of the long
struggle to end slavery and segregation. Those who read the opinion as
resting on "colorblindness" therefore make arguments about the meaning
of this history and appeal to one widely held view about its significance
for constitutional law.
The ways in which proponents of anticlassification have seized hold
of Justice Harlan's dissent illustrate the complicated and often contradic-
tory forms of authority that history exerts on our constitutional discourse.
History can exert powerful authority in our disagreements over the
meaning of the Constitution that is not originalist, but instead of a more
uncertain, but potentially even more powerful kind. Justice Harlan and
Plessy are now part of the nation's collective memory about this country's
struggle to end racism, and it is therein that the dissent finds its power and
why it exerts such constant-and often emotional-force in the equal
protection tradition.
A reassessment of Justice Harlan's dissent by reconstructing the his-
tory of the caste metaphor provides significant grounds to be skeptical of
arguments that posit the dissent as the fount of modern colorblindness
reasoning. The importance of caste as an image of social subordination in
these early debates suggests that Harlan's opinion should be understood as
articulating a concern about the social hierarchies that had been created
under slavery and that persisted with state sanction under Jim Crow.
Such a reading of the opinion would claim the opinion as evidence
of the longstanding influence of antisubordination reasoning in the equal
protection tradition. The opinion, of course, was concerned with classifi-
cation as well, but it was subordination that gave the caste metaphor in
the opinion its most fundamental commitment. The fact that Harlan was
able to say "colorblindness" and "caste" in the same breath reveals tectonic
shifts in the forms of argument in our debates over the meaning of equal
protection. In the late nineteenth century, anticlassification and antisubor-
dination were not polar opposites that were understood to have very
different consequences for permissible interventions by the state to re-
structure the social order, but instead part of a more flexible vocabulary
for discussing the harms inflicted by racial status.
The efforts by proponents of colorblindness to claim Brown as a re-
assertion of Harlan's dissent are also suspect in view of the salience of
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antisubordination arguments in the period leading up to the decision and
during its initial reception. Understanding the meaning of caste in the
context of these debates is beyond the reach of this Article's claims about
the misreading of Harlan's dissent. The reemergence of caste reasoning in
the mid-twentieth century, and its explicit references to this earlier tradi-
tion, suggests that colorblindness was not the most significant
contribution of Harlan's dissent to arguments about the problem of segre-
gation for these interpreters. Witnesses to the Court's decision in Brown
invoked caste in view of the arguments about social hierarchy in the nine-
teenth century It was the specter of caste, and not colorblindness, which
gave readings of Harlan's dissent their greatest force.
A clearer account of the history of caste reasoning also helps to re-
veal the common roots of antisubordination and anticlassification values.
These modern concepts obscure the more fluid and wide open set of ar-
guments about the nature of the social harm imposed by social hierarchies
of various kinds. Struggles over the translation of these conceptions of
status arrangements to legal doctrine has made it easy to forget the ways
in which the concern with classification and subordination overlap and
reinforce one another in our equality law.""
Revisiting the caste metaphor in Harlan's dissent challenges the co-
lorblind reading of the opinion in current debates over the fundamental
aspirations of our law. Harlan's proclaation-"There is no caste here"-
should be restored in the equal protection tradition for what it reveals
about the persistence of antisubordination reasoning throughout the nine-
teenth century, and the resurgence of these arguments in the debates over
Brown.
199. Balkin, supra note 19, at 28. Stating:
In short, application of the anticlassification principle often depends on
judgments concerning the presence, absence, or degree of status-halnn-the
very sorts ofjudgnients with which the antisubordination principle is con-
cerned. These judgments may be conscious or unconscious, explicit or
implicit, and they shift in time, in response to social mobilizations and other
developments. But they are present, nevertheless, in the evolving ways that
Americans understand the practical implications of the anticlassification
nornl.
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